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MULTIEMPLOYER BARGAINING AND MONOPOLY:




Multiemployer collective bargaining relationships between un-
ions and employer associations easily devolve into legalized
cartels. Once unions establish themselves as the bargaining
representative for employers' employees, the employers have
much to gain from banding together as an association, raising
their prices and eliminating non-union competition, with unions
happily serving as enforcement agents in the scheme. In return,
unions receive a share of the increased oligopolistic profits in
the form of higher wages and benefits.
A threat to such a cartel is an employer who wants to bargain
with the union but does not want to accept the terms the associ-
ation has bargained for. This Article examines the status of
such an employer. It outlines how unions and (especially) as-
sociations work to thwart such an employer from bargaining di-
rectly with a union despite the federal labor policy ofprotecting
an employer's freedom in selecting its bargaining representa-
tive. This anticompetitive behavior not only hurts individual
non-association employers but also non-association employers'
union employees, as the union will refuse to realistically bar-
gain with their employer unless it agrees to the terms in the as-
sociation agreement. This leads to the employer either being
forced to accept the association's terms, which it cannot afford,
or, if it survives a strike and picket, becoming non-union. A
middle ground of real bargaining that serves the non-
association employer's union employees' interests is not avail-
able. In enforcing this scheme a cartel's primary tactic is the
use of "most- favored-nations" clauses in multiemployer collec-
Attorney at Law. The views expressed in this Article are solely those of the Author and do
not necessarily reflect those of any current or past clients or employers. The Author wishes to
thank the participants at the Third Annual Colloquium on Current Scholarship in Labor and Em-
ployment Law, Lisa Bernstein, and Lee Otis, among others, for their helpful suggestions in the
formation of this Article, and Amy Hackbarth for keeping this Article on track.
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tive bargaining agreements. Another is the design and use of
multiemployer ERISA plans.
The Article also discusses the labor antitrust exemptions and
how, notwithstanding the suggestions of other scholars, anti-
trust law is an ineffective tool to remedy union-association car-
tel behavior. Instead, the Article advocates changes that can be
made to the labor laws and to ERISA that would allow individ-
ual employers to escape the terms of association collective bar-
gaining agreements and encourage unions to nevertheless bar-
gain with them. This does not mean that multiemployer bar-
gaining itselfshould be banned. Multiemployer bargaining has
always been with us and is not going away, but its anticompeti-
tive effects can be tempered.
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I. INTRODUCTION
When one envisions a small painting contractor, the word "unionized"
generally fails to come to mind. In popular-and even legal-consciousness,
unions are employee organizations who bargain with large Fortune 500 compa-
nies. Mammoth armies assemble on either side of a picket line or negotiating
table in a drama affecting assembly line employees of a huge, unitary enterprise.
The unions organize in factories or mines and their members work-or at least
aspire to work-for the same employer their entire lives.
This Hollywood image of collective bargaining applies to a fraction of
unionized employers. In reality, a union employee will often work for a small
338 [Vol. 113
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family-owned business with a handful of workers.' Their work for that employ-
er might be seasonal, or even just for one project.2 The bargaining unit the em-
ployee belongs to not only includes his or her coworkers, but also other em-
ployees working for competing companies. As for these companies themselves,
they may belong to an employer association that bargains as a whole with a un-
ion for their members' wages and other terms and conditions of employment.
Through this process, all of them-the employers and employees-will agree to
one solitary collective bargaining agreement. On one side rests a single union
but on the other sits a multitude of employers-small, large, and even one-
person shopS3 --competing with each other while bargaining with their em-
ployees' representative as one. Collectively, this phenomenon is known as
"multiemployer bargaining." Almost half of all private-sector collectively-
bargained workers work for employers who bargain in this manner.4
This Article explores the status of a unionized employer who competes
in an industry where multiemployer bargaining prevails. The employer is not
necessarily interested in becoming "non-union," but is interested in bargaining
directly with a union instead of through an association. This Article demon-
strates a little-noticed, but influential, difficulty that such an employer encoun-
ters when it leaves an association relationship. Because of a number of structur-
al realities in how multiemployer bargaining functions, an employer who exits
from a multiemployer association and bargains directly with a union will be
forced to either accept the contractual terms the association has separately bar-
gained for, the employer's exit notwithstanding, or will be unable to agree to a
contract with the union at all and may eventually become nonunion by default.
Indeed, going nonunion may often not be a viable option because of the control
the association and union exert over the relevant market. In that case, the em-
ployer's options may starkly be to agree to the terms of the association's con-
tract or cease operations altogether.
This state of affairs is highly anticompetitive, and it thwarts the most
basic rule of multiemployer bargaining: employers are free to assign and with-
draw their bargaining rights to an association. A multiemployer bargaining rela-
tionship only exists with the consent of all of those involved, the union and all
I This is especially true in the construction industry. See Harriet Weinstein & William J.
Wiatrowski, Multiemployer Pension Plans, 4 COMPENSATION & WORKING CONDITIONS 19, 20,
available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/cwc/archive/springl999art4.pdf ("About 83 percent of
construction establishments employ fewer than 10 workers; less than 1 percent of construction
establishments employ 100 workers or more.").
2 See John R. Leonard, Comment, Labor & Employment Law-A Deferential Standard for
Administrators Within a State Meant to Protect Workers-Bard v. Boston Shipping Assoc., 471
F.3d229 (1st Cir. 2006), 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 417, 419 n.21 (2008).
3 See Haas Garage Door Co., 308 N.L.R.B. 1186, 1187 (1992) (discussing the "one man
unit" rule when an employer with only one bargaining unit employee participates in a multiem-
ployer collective bargaining agreement).
4 See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 251 (1996) (stating that as of 1994, 44% of
collectively bargained employees worked under multiemployer bargaining agreements).
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of the employers. An employer must bargain with a union if the union has been
certified as the bargaining unit representative of its employees. The same is not
true of an employer vis-A-vis a multiemployer association. If it chooses, the
employer can bargain directly with the union and ignore the association. How-
ever, because of the structural realities of how multiemployer bargaining actual-
ly works, this "choice" does not exist. Therefore, if multiemployer bargaining
prevails in an industry, employers, against their will, must negotiate, often with
no success, with their own competitors in contracting with their employees.
This state of affairs is effectively protected from the antitrust laws be-
cause of the wide scope of the statutory and non-statutory labor exemptions
from the Sherman Act. It also is exacerbated by the Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), and the resulting power of multiemployer
employee benefit plans and their overseeing union and management trustees.
Most importantly, it is enabled through the use of most-favored nations-clauses
(MFNs) in union-association collective bargaining agreements.
This Article details how unions and associations collude against indi-
vidual employers who try to bargain directly with their employees' union and
argues that the structure of multiemployer bargaining does not further the inter-
ests of such individual employers or their unionized employees. An individual
employer who disagrees with the bargaining goals of the predominant interests
in its association is unable to escape those interests through direct bargaining,
even though those interests favor its competitors. Instead, its competitors dic-
tate its labor policy. Further, its employees may be willing to accept the alterna-
tive bargaining terms the individual employer is willing to offer, but cannot be-
cause of their union's relationship to the association.
On the other hand, this structure does further the goals of the employers
who predominate an industry. It creates an anticompetitive cartel that protects
the dominant interests in associations by discouraging any other employers from
bargaining on different terms with the union. It is at once anticompetitive and
antiunion as it increases the chances that a firm that exits an association, and
survives, will become nonunion.
This Article offers a partial solution to this problem. As long as there
have been unions there have been multiemployer associations. Multiemployer
associations are not going away, nor should they. The danger with an associa-
tion is that while countering the union's bargaining power, the association will
collude with the union to inhibit competition and share the resulting rents. Sug-
gestions, going back to the crafting of the Taft-Hartley Act, have been made to
simply ban multiemployer bargaining. However, banning association bargain-
ing itself would be ineffective, and would likely result in similar anticompeti-
tive, but hidden, behavior. Further, the counter normally offered as a solution to
union-association cartels-use of the antitrust laws-relies too heavily on ques-
tions of intent to be of much use to a hapless individual employer, or its em-
ployees, escaping a powerful association.
Instead, this Article recommends that individual employers who exit an
association be granted extra allowances under the labor laws to "go it alone."
340 [Vol. 113
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These allowances include a bar against area standards picketing and recogni-
tional picketing after an employer exits an association when the relevant associ-
ation's collective bargaining agreement contains an MFN. They also include a
bar on the imposition of withdrawal liability from defined benefit pension plans
for employers who exit an association but nevertheless want to continue to par-
ticipate in the relevant plan. With these protections in place unions will be less
willing to grant MFN clauses to associations, and individual employers will then
be free to bargain directly with unions. These changes are less intrusive in the
collective bargaining process than simply banning MFNs, and in the case of the
picketing bar can be implemented without Congressional action.
This Article begins in Part I with an outline of how multiemployer bar-
gaining functions, including the part ERISA plays. Part II explains the extent of
the antitrust exemption that multiemployer bargaining enjoys. Its review of
labor antitrust cases will also provide examples of union-association anticompe-
titive practices. Part III discusses in detail the reasons why a union will not of-
fer terms any different from those of an association to an individual employer.
Part IV suggests several ways that labor law and ERISA could be used to pro-
tect the choices of individual employers and their employees and protect against
union-association cartels.
II. MULTIEMPLOYER BARGAINING AND THE NATURE OF TAFT-HARTLEY
FRINGE BENEFIT PLANS
A. Multiemployer Bargaining as a Phenomenon
Multiemployer associations have existed since at least classical antiqui-
ty, and seem to arise whenever unions themselves emerge.' An episode of mul-
tiemployer bargaining is detailed, for example, on a stone tablet found at the site
of ancient Sardis.6 Over the centuries, associations have formed and interacted
with unions in a multitude of variations. In Medieval Europe, this manifested
itself robustly in the craft guild system.7 At the time of the founding of the
American colonies, however, the guild system was disappearing in England.
By the American Revolution, associations in the new United States were rather
informal and local.9 Associations grew again with the coming of the factory
system and the increasing force of the industrial revolution in the 1830s, follow-
5 CLARENCE E. BONNETT, HISTORY OF EMPLOYERS' ASSOCIATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 22
(1956) ("Both associations and unions existed, largely as secret organizations, in ancient
Greece.").
6 Id. at 23.
7 Id. at 24-33 (recounting struggles between apprentices, journeymen, and masters, and the
groups they formed).
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ing an organizing trend among workers. 0 During this time, association activity
followed a "boom and bust" cycle of unions and the economy at large." In his
comprehensive history of multiemployer bargaining in the Nineteenth Century,
Professor Clarence Bonnett details multiple occasions when employees across
an industry would form a union and threaten to strike.12 In these struggles the
employers, of course, were by definition competitors of each other. Their "car-
telization" over lower wages was often only useful to the extent it was worth
manning a united front against the union. Thus, before the federal labor laws
cemented the modem structure of collective bargaining into place, associations
constantly rose and fell in response to the rise of unions in different localities at
different times for different purposes.
With the coming of federal labor legislation in the 1930s unions sudden-
ly enjoyed the security of being certified as bargaining representatives with the
force of the National Labor Relations Board behind them.13 To a much greater
extent than before, unions and their corresponding employers could now count
on collective bargaining remaining a fixture of their labor relations. This gave a
much longer lifespan to associations, as employers who wished to organize in
opposition to unions had an incentive to continue to do so on a practically per-
manent basis. If a union was going to last, it made sense to organize a more-
permanent association structure and to ally oneself with the union, instead of
seeking to crush it. Employer associations, therefore, became a permanent fix-
ture of many industries, especially transportation, apparel, hotels and restau-
rants, and, more than any other, construction.14 Although private-sector union-
ism has dramatically declined since the years following the passage of the
Wagner Act in 1935, the percentage of the unionized workforce that works un-
der multiemployer bargaining has remained fairly constant at a little less than
half.'"
10 Id. at 45-54 (detailing repeated strikes and employer counters in various industries during
the 1830s).
" See generally BONNETT, supra note 5 (describing the rise and fall of various unions in dif-
ferent American cities in different trades).
12 See generally id. (extensively describing strikes and association activity during the Nine-
teenth Century).
13 See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1935) (amended 1947).
14 Douglas L. Leslie, Multiemployer Bargaining Rules, 75 VA. L. REv. 241, 264 (1989) (listing
apparel, construction, and hotels and restaurants as industries where multiemployer bargaining is
common). Readers will notice that much of the discussion in this Article relates to the construc-
tion industry. This reflects the numerical dominance of construction unions and employers in the
multiemployer, employee-benefit universe. For example, according to the Department of Labor,
1228 of the 2945 multiemployer pension plans in the country are in the construction industry. The
next highest is finance, insurance and real estate at 530, and 371 in the services industry. See U.S.
Dept. of Labor, Pension & Welfare Benefits Admin. Office of Research & Econ. Analysis,
ABSTRACT OF 2005 FORM 5500 ANNUAL REPORTS 13 (2005), available at
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/PDF/2005pensionplanbulletin.PDF.
15 Compare Lloyd Ulman, Unionism & Collective Bargaining in the Modern Period, in
AMERICAN ECONOMIC HISTORY 448 (Seymour Harris ed., 1961) (describing various rates depend-
[Vol. 113342
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With so much variety in how associations operate, and how they inte-
ract with their members' employees, pinning down what constitutes an employ-
er association, and thus what constitutes multiemployer bargaining, is not a
clean exercise. Professor Bonnett provided a very general definition that serves
for present purposes: "The test whether an association exists is a functional one:
is there concerted action among employers in promoting their interests in a par-
ticular labor controversy, or in labor matters in general?"16 Similarly, regarding
how these associations attend to labor matters, the Developing Labor Law de-
fines multiemployer bargaining as "collective bargaining in which more than
one employer or an association of employers participate in common negotia-
tions with a group or groups of unions as distinct from single-employer bargain-
* ,17
ing.
The National Labor Relations Board, and the federal courts, have gener-
ally followed these understandings. Neither the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) nor the Taft-Hartley Act explicitly discuss multiemployer bargaining. 8
However, the fact that Congress failed to adopt an amendment to the Taft-
Hartley Act that would have severely limited the practice,19 and the fact that it is
a long-standing labor-management tool, have led the courts to, not just tolerate,
but also to encourage multiemployer bargaining.20
The exact details of how employers agree to bargain as an association
can vary. The association does not have to have a formal structure, and does not
even need one master agreement if the separate employers jointly bargain and
execute substantially similar contracts with the union.2 1 Historically, as well as
today, associations are often geographically defined to a metropolitan area, but
ing on the industry, with more than half of all unionized workers working under multiemployer
agreements in non-manufacturing sectors, and less in manufacturing, in the late 1940s and early
1950s); with Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 251 (1996) (stating that as of 1994, 44%
of collectively bargained employees worked under multiemployer bargaining agreements).
16 BONNETT, supra note 5, at 22.
17 AM. BAR Ass'N SECTION OF LABOR & EMP'T LAW, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 712 (John
E. Higgins, Jr., et al. eds., 5th ed. 2006).
18 Robert H. Lande & Richard 0. Zerbe, Jr., Anticonsumer Effects of Union Mergers: An Anti-
trust Solution, 46 DUKE L.J. 197, 208 (1996) (stating that no statute explicitly permits multiem-
ployer bargaining).
19 H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 552-53 (1947) (House bill imposing limitations on
multiemployer bargaining); Robert W. Tollen, When is a Multiemployer Bargaining Unit a "Mul-
tiemployer Bargaining Unit"?, 17 LAB. LAW. 183, 186 (2001) (mentioning House bill).
20 NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 449, 353 U.S. 87, 95-96 (1957) (recognizing multiemployer
bargaining as allowed by labor legislation). Further, the legislative history to the Clayton Act
indicates that, as well as legislating to protect unions' right to organize in the face of the antitrust
laws, Congress meant to protect employers' concerted labor activity as well. See Bernard D.
Meltzer, Labor Unions, Collective Bargaining, & the Antitrust Laws, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 659, 672
n.53 (1965).
21 AM. BAR Ass'N SECTION OF LABOR & EMP'T LAW, supra note 17, at 715-16 n.422.
343
7
Sanders: Multiemployer Bargaining and Monopoly: Labor-Management Collusion
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2011
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
some nationwide multiemployer bargaining exists. 2 2 Multiemployer bargaining
is distinct from pattern bargaining, in which a union negotiates a contract with
one employer-often the largest employer in an industry-and then seeks to
obtain contracts with the same terms from the other employers in that industry.23
In pattern bargaining, although the same terms are often negotiated in different
contracts, each employer negotiates on behalf of itself2 4 In multiemployer bar-
gaining, however, the employers negotiate collectively on behalf of themselves.
This distinction is key to the problem addressed in Part III, below.2 5
The very existence of multiemployer bargaining is a bit of a mystery.2 6
Indeed, it is somewhat counterintuitive that the phenomenon exists at all. Mul-
tiemployer contracts generally provide for uniform wages and benefits across an
industry and locality for all association employers.27 Since the price of labor is
perhaps the largest part of an employer's costs, the question arises of why an
employer would agree to pay the same labor rates as all of its unionized compet-
28itors. An employer conceivably would be better served to bargain with the
union individually for wages slightly below those of its competitors, thus lend-
ing it the upper hand in the marketplace but retaining its unionized status. One
reason proffered for why this does not occur more often is that a top priority for
unions is equal pay for equal work within a trade. 29 Indeed, unions are statutori-
ly permitted to eliminate labor market competition.30 If a union is going to bar-
gain for the same wage rate from all employers, the employers would be well
22 See Howard Wial, The Emerging Organizational Structure of Unionism in Low- Wage Ser-
vices, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 671, 681 n.34 (1993) (recognizing nationwide bargaining in the auto
industry).
23 See Frank C. Pierson, Prospects for Industry- Wide Bargaining, 3 INDuS. & LAB. REL. REV.
341, 344-46 (1950).
24 Milton C. Regan, Jr., Multi-Unit Collective Bargaining: Autonomy & Dependence in Liber-
al Thought, 72 GEO. L.J. 1369, 1369 n.6 (1984) (explaining that pattern bargaining results in simi-
lar terms at various employers, but different collective bargaining agreements for each company).
25 See Part Ill, infra.
26 Leslie, supra note 14, at 278 ("An 'economic analysis' of multiemployer bargaining and the
rules that govern it is thus devilishly difficult.").
27 Cf Lande & Zerbe, supra note 18, at 216-17 (describing union efforts to regularize wages
across their geographic jurisdictions); Comment, The Status of Multiemployer Bargaining Under
the National Labor Relations Act, 1967 DuKE L.J. 558, 560 (1967) (describing how unions gener-
ally favor multiemployer bargaining in order to standardize wages and working conditions); Pier-
son, supra note 23, at 342 (stating that the obligations of various signatory employers to a mul-
tiemployer contract are largely uniform).
28 Further, where labor constitutes a greater portion of costs, multiemployer bargaining has
been found to be more likely. See Lande & Zerbe, supra note 18, at 219-20 n. 106.
29 See id, at 219 n.105 (arguing that unions may choose not to price discriminate between
employers, even when they can, because of the internal tension it might create); Jan Vetter, Com-
mentary on "Multiemployer Bargaining Rules": Searching for the Right Questions, 75 VA. L.
REv. 285, 286 (1989) ("Among competing employers in the same market, the union will push for,
while it is also pulled toward, the goal of equal pay for equal work.").
30 Thomas J. Campbell, Labor Law & Economics, 38 STAN. L. REv. 991, 1005 (1986).
[Vol. 1 13344
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served to put forward a united front in keeping those wages as low as possible.
Conspiring with this drive is multiemployer bargaining's exemption from the
antitrust laws, which allows competitors to collude on setting labor prices
while engaged in collective bargaining. 3 2 Dovetailing with the union's desire
for equal pay, employers may find multiemployer bargaining an appealing
second-best alternative as they may fear that if they bargain individually they
will be left paying higher wages than their competitors.3 3 Perhaps most impor-
tantly, and as explained in detail below, through the antitrust exemption the as-
sociation can use the union to inhibit nonunion competition, thus increasing the
association members' prices and profits.34
Regarding the peace multiemployer bargaining can bring, employers
may also agree to join associations to protect themselves from whipsaw
strikes.s A "whipsaw strike" occurs when a union strikes one employer at a
time, focusing its resources on one target so that that employer succumbs to the
union's demands, allowing the union to then move on to the next. 36 A union
may dip into a strike fund to assist the striking workers of the first employer
while the rest of its membership continues to work for the remaining employ-
ers. 37 Through an association, all of its member employers can lockout their
employees when the union threatens a strike against one member, thereby nulli-
31 See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 235-36 (1996) (detailing the "nonstatutory"
labor antitrust exemption and extending it to collusion among firms after a bargaining impasse).
The antitrust exemptions are discussed in detail, infra Part II.
32 See, e.g., Leslie, supra note 14, at 265 ("Multiemployer bargaining assures the manager that
he and other firms' managers will chose the same wage rates."); Teresa Ghilarducci & Michael
Reich, Complementarity of Pensions & Training under Multiemployer Plans (pt. 1), 22 J. OF
LABOR RESEARCH 615, 620 (2001) ("[F]irms can garner rents if there is implicit collusion with
other firms to take wages out of competition.").
3 See Douglas L. Leslie, Labor Bargaining Units, 70 VA. L. REv. 353, 416 (1984) (stating that
risk-averse managers will be more likely to consent to multiemployer bargaining); Pierson, supra
note 23, at 358 (arguing that multiemployer bargaining is largely a defensive measure by firms
against unions). Cf Lande & Zerbe, supra note 18, at 207 n.54 (stating that employers are often
concerned not with absolute prices but prices in comparison to competitors).
34 See infra Part I.B.
3 See Comment, Employer Withdrawal from Multi-Employer Bargaining Units: A Proposal
for Self-Regulation, 130 U. PENN. L. REv. 689, 693 (1982); AM. BAR Ass'N SECTION OF LABOR &
EMP'T LAW, supra note 17, at 714 ("Employers recognize that an employers' association can
eliminate wage competition, help to prevent whipsaw strikes, and achieve certain economies of
scale.").
36 Michael H. LeRoy, Lockouts Involving Replacement Workers: An Empirical Public Policy
Analysis and Proposal to Balance Economic Weapons Under the NLRA, 74 WASH. U. L. Q. 981,
999-1000 (1996).
3 Note, Whipsawing in Multiemployer Bargaining, 3 STAN. L. REv. 510, 510 (1951) ("The
union may exert full strike pressure against one employer. Most of its members remain at work.
Money jingles in their jeans and morale is unimpaired. Strike benefit funds take care of the strik-
ing workers with comparative ease.").
345
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fying the union's targeting tactics and bringing the employers' collective re-
sources into play.38
Additionally, unions often regard multiemployer bargaining favorably.
First, multiemployer bargaining allows unions to obtain equal wages and work-
ing conditions across an industry through the employers' collusion, in turn dam-
pening competition between employers. Second, it conserves union resources
because the union only has to engage in one bargaining relationship instead of
negotiating the countless different collective bargaining agreements it would
have to enter into if the many-often hundreds-of members of the association
negotiated individually. 40 Third, it centralizes employers into not just negotiat-
ing wages and working conditions, but into funding and assisting in the adminis-
tration of jointly-managed employee benefit plans, including pensions, health
care plans, and apprentice programs. 4 1 These "Taft-Hartley Funds" are dis-
cussed below.42
B. Multiemployer Bargaining's Anticompetitive Effects
Although employers can hardly be faulted for joining forces to counte-
ract certain union divide-and-conquer tactics, such as whipsaw strikes, or for
agreeing to pay the same wage when they suspect their competitors will nego-
tiate the right to pay less, allowing employers to come together and set collec-
tive labor policy is fraught with the danger of collusion. As Adam Smith fa-
mously observed, "[p]eople of the same trade seldom meet together, even for
merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the
public, or in some contrivance to raise prices." 4 3 The following illustrates some
38 NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 449, 353 U.S. 87, 97 (1957) (recognizing employers' right to
a collective lockout); Note, supra note 37, at 511 ("[Employers] know that if the union is success-
ful any one of them may be next. The employers claim that the strike against one is really a strike
against all. The unstruck employers shut down their plants as a concerted action against the un-
ion.").
39 See Lande & Zerbe, supra note 18, at 220 (multiemployer bargaining helps both unions and
employers to capture rents); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Collective Bargaining and Competition: The
Application ofAntitrust Standards to Union Activities, 73 YALE L.J. 14, 20 (1963) (explaining that
unions in competitive markets will try to prevent competition between employers).
40 See Michael C. Harper, Multiemployer Bargaining, Antitrust Law, and Team Sports: The
Contingent Choice of a Broad Exception, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1663, 1681 (1997). This does
not necessarily mean that employers as a whole would have a competitive advantage over a union
if they bargained individually, as unions would have greater experience and skill in bargaining
labor contracts. See Pierson, supra note 23, at 358 (stating that employers are usually at a serious
disadvantage if they bargain alone in a multiemployer market).
41 See Harper, supra note 40, at 1681 (discussing how pooling of employer contributions
creates the opportunity for group benefits); Comment, supra note 27, at 561 (naming apprentice
programs as a benefit from multiemployer pooling).
42 See infra Part I.C.
43 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS,
Book I, 10.82 (1776).
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of the dangers of collusion in multiemployer bargaining. Later, the application
of antitrust law to these dangers will be considered.
The economics of cartel behavior among employers and unions have
been well documented in previous works on labor antitrust, so the following is a
brief outline of what anticompetitive dangers multiemployer bargaining creates,
drawn from the cited sources."
Employers may seek to collude on labor policy whether they are collec-
tively-bargained or nonunion. Setting antitrust law aside for a moment, in a
labor market without collective bargaining, employers could conceivably col-
lude and set wages at a lower level than would exist under a competitive market.
However, the more employers that participate in the market, and the more com-
petitive the market, the more organized the cartel must be and the more difficult
holding the cartel together becomes. Employers who do not participate will
have an incentive to be "free riders." They can pay just enough more than the
cartel wage to induce the cartel members' best workers to work for them, and
yet still pay less than the market wage that would exist without a cartel. Further,
even employers participating in the cartel will have an incentive to cheat and
receive the same benefit. As long as the eventual profit in higher prices that can
be received through poaching better workers exceeds the difference between
wages paid and the cartel wage, employers will have an incentive to "free ride"
on the cartel. Note that this only concerns the danger of collusion in the labor
market, not in the product market, where there is also a danger to social welfare
in the form of a cartel fixing above-market prices. However, collusion regard-
ing prices in the product market will generally be illegal under the antitrust
laws; this is not so in the labor market if the cartel members collectively bar-
gain.
In a collectively-bargained regime under a multiemployer collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) the potential for cartel behavior becomes the mir-
ror-image of the above scenario. The union bargains with the employers for a
certain wage. This wage is higher than the market wage through the union's
successful certification as the exclusive bargaining representative, i.e. a mono-
poly of the employers' labor supply. However, as long as the relevant compet-
ing employers are all members of the multiemployer association, they can agree
to an above-market wage and pass that cost, en masse, along to their customers,
assuming some inelasticity in the product market.4 5 Thus, instead of obtaining
rents through collusion of below-market wages, the employers obtain rents
through collusion of above-market wages and a subsequent mark-up beyond the
cost of those wages in the product market.46 The union and the employers each
" Especially helpful was Douglas L. Leslie, Principles of Labor Antitrust, 66 VA. L. REV.
1183 (1980).
45 That is, assuming that the buyers in the product market will purchase as much, or nearly as
much, product when the price goes up.
4 Lande & Zerbe, supra note 18, at 207 n.54 (explaining that in multiemployer bargaining it is
possible that unions and employers will conspire to form a cartel and divide rents).
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enjoy a share of this mark-up.4 7 Just as in the nonunion scenario, there is the
possibility of competitors refusing to participate, cheating, or participating but
then openly leaving the cartel. Now, instead of policing themselves, the em-
ployers have the union to assist them, making cartel behavior more likely and
more successful because there is an outside agent enforcing cartel rules.
In this policing, the union has a variety of tactics to ensure the associa-
tion's competitors, and cheating members, do not threaten the association's
members' mark-up. First, if a new competitor arises, the union can seek to or-
ganize that competitor's workforce, essentially making the employer join the
cartel.48 If the employer refuses to bargain with the union after a showing of
majority support, the union can, through a successful organizing campaign, peti-
tion and win an election. As part of this process, the union can picket the place
of business of the recalcitrant employer, or a job site on which the employer is
working, either for recognition or, for a period of up to thirty days, to inform the
public that the employer does not pay "area standards," i.e. union wages. 49 it
can also handbill the public regarding these matters.50 In the construction and
apparel industries, through the exceptions to the NLRA's ban on "hot cargo"
agreements, the union can also exert some degree of secondary pressure, such as
forbidding association members from subcontracting to nonunion contractors.5
Because of the union's "police" presence, this secondary pressure from the un-
ion is much more effective for the cartel as a whole than merely expecting an
employer to refuse to engage in business with nonunion, i.e. non-cartel, compa-
nies itself. Further, a union in the construction industry can even allow an em-
ployer to sign a "prehire agreement" when the employer has no showing of ma-
jority support, or has not yet hired any employees. 52 This allows construction
industry unions to make their control of a market so well-recognized that the
prospective employer joins the cartel without the union having to wage an orga-
nizing campaign.
Second, the union can keep labor away from nonunion employers by
administering an apprentice program or a closed hiring hall. The union and the
association can agree that only apprentice graduates can work for association
employers. This has the ancillary benefit of making a higher skilled workforce,
and thus raising the price employers can charge as well as raising union em-
ployee wages. More importantly it provides an incentive for prospective work-
ers to join the union and work for association members, creating greater scarcity
47 How much of the mark-up the employers or the union employees receive, or even how
much the mark-up will be, will be uncertain and disputed. See Thomas J. Campbell, Labor Law &
Economics, 38 STAN. L. REV. 991, 1007 (1986) (stating that for unions to be successful they must
maximize the capture of what an employer gains from the employees).
48 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2006).
49 Id. § 158(b)(7).
o Id
5 Id. § 158(e).
52 Id. § 158(f).
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of higher quality workers among nonunion employers. Further, the institution
of a closed hiring hall requires all association members to hire new employees
through the hiring hall.54 This not only better polices employers in hiring union
employees, but allows the union to better regulate where union members work,
keeping them away from nonunion employers.
Third, to prevent association members from cheating, the union can re-
spond to reports of cheating from its employee members and use intra-cartel
grievance mechanisms. Although a unionized employee will often have alle-
giance to his employer over the union, and therefore be reluctant to report viola-
tions of the CBA, the cartel can provide protections that give a member some
degree of security, such as contractual whistleblower protections and grievance
arbitration. The union can also negotiate the right to place stewards in places
of employment who, although employed by the employer, are primarily watch-
dogs for the union.56 The cartel can also establish joint trade boards to provide
for arbitration of not just individual grievances on matters such as wages, but of
other contractual violations, such as allowing unreported overtime or not report-
ing jobs to the union. Joint trade boards are composed of representatives of the
union and association employers, so employers can directly affect the punish-
ment enforced against their cheating competitors.5 7 These boards can be given
the power to award damages and fine individual association members for viola-
tions. Fines issued by joint trade boards can be quite onerous, and, as with any
labor arbitration, are reviewed by courts under an extremely deferential stan-
dard.
A fourth set of tactics cartels engage in to protect their rents is to dis-
courage exit from the association. The union and association can negotiate con-
tractual provisions and engage in tactics that make exit difficult, and make busi-
5 See Campbell, supra note 47, at 1006 (discussing how unions can restrict the labor supply
through apprenticeship requirements).
54 Comment, supra note 27, at 559-60 n.4.
5s See AM. BAR Ass'N SECTION OF LABOR & EMP'T LAW, supra note 17, at 1532 (discussing
protections against retaliation and grievance arbitration).
56 See id. at 381-83 (discussing super-seniority positions granted to steward placements).
5 See id. at 1555; see also SCI Illinois Servs., Inc. v. Local 727, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
47305, at *38-40 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (enforcing joint trade board award despite argument that em-
ployer board members were biased against a competitor). SCI is rather remarkable. The court
reasons that employer board members will not vote against competitors qua competitors because
if they did the union would file repeated charges against different employers until the board mem-
bers themselves would become targets. This admittedly brief statement in dicta misses the point:
the union and employer board members could collude against the employers board members'
competitors, resulting in reciprocal charges and voting in the future. The union board members
would understand that the employer members would cease to cooperate if their own companies, or
allies, became targets.
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ness after an exit even harder. These are discussed in detail in Part III.59 To
summarize for present purposes, the association can secure an MFN in its CBA
which prevents an exiting member from securing better terms from the union
than it would have received had it stayed with the association. The union can
then strike the exiting employer who will be left without the protection of an
association lockout, and will have no terms it can agree with the union on to
stop the strike other than those in the association's CBA. If the employer sur-
vives the strike the union can then still picket for area standards and, in the con-
struction and apparel industries, exert certain secondary pressures.
The cartel can also pressure the exiting employer through control of the
Taft-Hartley multiemployer fringe benefit plans that the union and association,
through appointed trustees, administer. Although wage rates will likely be the
largest labor problem for an employer, the requirements of Taft-Hartley plans
and ERISA are also very useful to a cartel's control of exiting employers.
Before moving on to the antitrust considerations of the above-described
cartel, given the power Taft-Hartley plans have over association members a
preliminary outline of how these plans operate is in order.
C. Taft-Hartley Plans
"Taft-Hartley" plans are so-called because such collectively-bargained
plans must be jointly-managed by representatives of labor and management
under section 302 of the Taft-Hartley Act.60 A prime goal of a union under mul-
tiemployer conditions is to establish health care and pension plans where bene-
fits will be portable when a union member changes employers.61  This not only
benefits the membership, but also weakens the power of any one employer over
a union member because the member can bring his health care coverage and
pension credits with him to another employer.
Section 302(a) of Taft-Hartley prohibits employers from contributing
funds to unions and union officials.62 Section 302(c), however, enumerates a
number of exceptions to this ban, including the payment of funds to jointly ad-
ministered labor-management plans for pension and welfare benefits.6 3 Under
the Internal Revenue Code these contributions are tax exempt, thus providing
the well-understood incentive for employers to contribute to employees' health
s9 See Part III, infra.
6o See Pub. L. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (June 23, 1947) (legislation known as the "Taft-Hartley
Act").
61 See Harper, supra note 40, at 1681 (describing how multiemployer bargaining provides for
the pooling of resources for benefit plans); Comment, supra note 35, at 693 n.23 (listing "pension
plans, medical benefits, unemploymeit compensation, and industry-wide apprenticeship and
training programs" as fringe benefits made possible through pooling of employer contributions).
62 29 U.S.C. § 186(a) (2006).
63 Id. § 186(c) (enumerating permissible contributions from an employer to a union when
made to a trust fund for the benefit of employees).
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insurance6" and retirement benefits.65 This also includes other benefits that
serve the membership such as apprenticeship programs.66
It was only just prior to the Taft-Hartley Act's passage in 1947 that wel-
fare and pension benefits began to appear in multiemployer CBAs. The first
negotiated multiemployer pension benefits were obtained in 1946 through the
efforts of the United Mine Workers.67 Encouraged by the passage of section
302 of Taft-Hartley the next year, the popularity of multiemployer labor-
management fringe benefit plans ballooned thereafter.68 A direct impetus for
this growth was the National Labor Relations Board's (NLRB) ruling that fringe
benefits are a mandatory subject of bargaining.69 This meant that every time a
multiemployer association and a union sat down to negotiate a contract they had
to discuss whether or not that contract should require welfare and pension bene-
fits, and if so, how much and how to fund them. This required a corresponding
growth in welfare and pension plan administration, funding procedures, and
collection procedures when employers become delinquent in their contribu-
tions.70
A labor-management fringe benefit plan is a rather odd creature. It is
jointly administered by trustees from both labor and participating employers
who decide questions such as the level of benefits, where to invest the plan's
assets, and when to pursue collection efforts against delinquent employers.7
Other than the few mandates provided in the Taft-Hartley Act, the details of
how the plans must be structured and the extent of the trustees' fiduciary obliga-
tions are governed by ERISA. 72 One curious feature of the plans is that the em-
ployer representatives usually are individuals who, in their non-trustee capaci-
ties, are officers of companies competing with other members of the association
6 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(9) (2006) (welfare benefits).
65 Id. § 40 1(i) (pension benefits).
66 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(6) (2006).
67 Ghilarducci & Reich, supra note 32, at 616. This does not include union-sponsored funds,
not created pursuant to collective bargaining, which date back to at least 1867. Weinstein & Wia-
trowski, supra note 1, at 20 (naming the Cigar Makers Union as the first union-sponsored benefit
fund).
68 "From 1948 to 1959, multiemployer plans grew from 750,000 participants to more than 3
million." Ghilarducci & Reich, supra note 32, at 616. By 1973, the number of participants in
defined-benefit multiemployer pension plans reached 7.5 million, and by 1989 the number of
participants reached 10.4 million. Weinstein & Wiatrowski, supra note 1, at 21.
69 See Inland Steel Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1, 4 (1948) (pension benefits are a mandatory subject or
bargaining); W.W. Cross & Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1162, 1163 (1948) (health care benefits are a man-
datory subject of bargaining).
70 See, e.g., Thomas M. Griffin, Investing Labor Union Pension Funds in Workers: How
ERISA & the Common Law Trust May Benefit Labor By Economically Targeting Investment, 32
SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 11, 30-31 (1998) (describing the rapid expansion of pension plans in the
1950s).
71 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5)(B) (2006).
72 See, e.g., id. § 1104 (detailing trustees' fiduciary duties).
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(or multiple associations for many larger plans) that participate in the plans."
Although employer representatives are not supposed to wear their employer
"hat" in making plan decisions in their trustee capacity, 74 just as in grievance
joint trade boards,7 the potential exists for structuring the plan in a manner fa-
vorable to management trustees but unfavorable to other association members.
The potential also exists for directing collection efforts against association com-
petitors whom an employer trustee has a special grudge against-whether be-
cause that employer outbids the trustee on jobs, has headhunted the trustee's
employees, another financial reason, or simple personal animosity. Further, an
employer trustee could be tempted to structure the plan in a manner that favors
the trustee's business model, but not the model of his competitors.
Even under the structure of ERISA, multiemployer plans, especially
health and welfare plans, have a great deal of flexibility in crafting contribution
requirements. Generally, contributions are made at a set amount per each hour
73 See, e.g., Laurence B. Wohl, Fiduciary Duties Under ERISA: A Tale of Multiple Loyalties,
20 U. DAYTON L. REv. 43, 56 (1994) ("'ERISA permits employers to wear two hats, and ... they
assume fiduciary status only when and to the extent that they function in their capacity as plan
administrators, not when they conduct business that is not regulated by ERISA.' Consequently,
corporate officials can be ERISA plan fiduciaries-representing both plan participants who are
current corporate employees and plan beneficiaries who are former employees-while owing a
duty of loyalty to the corporation's stockholders. These two (perhaps three) groups clearly possess
conflicting interests." (quoting Amato v. W. Union Int'l, Inc., 773 F.2d 1402, 1416-17 (2d Cir.
1985))).
74 Trustees, as fiduciaries, must act solely for the benefit of the plan's participants and benefi-
ciaries. 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(1) (2006) ("[T]he assets of a plan . . . shall be held for the exclusive
purposes of providing benefits to participants in the plan and their beneficiaries and defraying
reasonable expenses of administering the plan."); id. § 1104(a)(1) ("[A] fiduciary shall discharge
his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries. . .
7s See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
76 Commentators recognize that, as human beings, trustees can never entirely separate their
dual sets of duties: "[A] trustee has a legal obligation to ignore the constituency that appointed
him or her. This duty imposed on a trustee is inconsistent with economic reality. A union official
is going to worry about loss of union jobs regardless of the pronouncements of the Supreme
Court. Similarly, the employer representative will worry about the industry and competition." Ira
R. Mitzner, Trustee Pressures When There is an Economic Downturn, in 35 EMPLOYEE BENEFIT
IssuEs-THE MULTIEMPLOYER PERSPECTIVE 517, 519 (1993) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
See also Carolyn D. Gentile, "The Check is in the Mail "-Mastering the Maze ofEmployer Con-
tribution to ERISA Plans, 72 MARQ. L. REv. 349, 362 n.70 (1989) ("[E]mployer trustees are some-
times influenced to be overly zealous in their pursuit of receivables because the delinquent em-
ployer may well be their competitor.").
n For example, pension plans must compute eligibility on the basis of "hours of service,"
although there is flexibility in how those are computed. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 410(a)(3)(A) (2006)
(defining "year of service" as a year "during which the employee has not less than 1,000 hours of
service"). Eligibility requirements for welfare plans are not as strict as for pension plans. See,
e.g., Harms v. Cavenham Forest Indus., Inc., 984 F.2d 686, 690-91 (5th Cir. 1993) (because disa-
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bargaining unit members work. Sometimes plans use different metrics, such
as a flat amount for every day or week worked.79 Participating employers then
generally pay their contributions on a monthly basis, with a set due date in the
month following the month when the work was performed. If an employer has
not reported the hours its employees have worked, and deposited with the plan
the corresponding amount owed by the monthly due date, the employer is delin-
quent. At that point, the written terms of the collective bargaining agreement, or
the plan's governing documents, impose liquidated damages and interest on the
employer for missing the due date.8 ' If the contributions remain unpaid, the
fiduciary for or on behalf of the plan may decide to file suit to collect the contri-
butions, plus liquidated damages, interest, and attorneys fees and costs. 82 These
liquidated damages, interest, and attorneys fees can be quite punitive, so even
the threat of an ERISA suit to collect unpaid contributions may be enough to
force an employer to pay what the trustees allege is owed.83
Taft-Hartley plans, therefore, provide another weapon on behalf of the
cartel to police the association's membership. To summarize those weapons, a
joint trade board can fine an employer for non-payment of wages or other con-
tractual violations, a union member can inform the union of his employer's con-
tractual breach, the union can picket an employer who refuses to unionize, and
the pension and welfare plans can extract penalties of up to 20%, plus interest
and attorneys fees, on employers who fail to pay contributions under the terms
7 James V. Cole II, The Demisay Dilemma, 2 GEO. MASON L. REv. (STUDENT ED.) 377, 394
(1995) (discussing tying pension contributions to hours of service).
7 See, e.g., Trs. of the Suburban Teamsters v. Hope Cartage, Inc., No. 02-C8775, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 27866, at * 12 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (interpreting CBA as requiring contributions "to the
Pension fund for each regular employee who worked two calendar days in any calendar week").
80 See Gentile, supra note 76, at 354 ("[E]mployee benefit funds that arise out of collective
bargaining depend in large measure upon the submission of contribution reports from the employ-
er. These reports contain the basic data essential to the fund's operation, i.e., the amount of time
worked by employees who are covered by the contract, and the sums of money that are due as
contributions."); see also Robbins v. Prosser's Moving & Storage Co., 700 F.2d 433, 435-36 (8th
Cir. 1983) (discussing monthly reports due on the fifteenth of the following month); Flynn v.
Angelucci Bros. & Sons, Inc., 448 F. Supp. 2d 193, 196-97 (D.D.C. 2006) (discussing monthly
payments and due dates).
81 See Craig W. Trepanier, Note, Trading Places: Employer Strategies to Avoid Mandatory
Awards of Interest, Liquidated Damages, and Attorney's Fees Under the MPPAA, 78 MINN. L.
REV. 229, 236 (1993) (describing liquidated damages provision in ERISA relating to collective
bargaining agreements).
82 Id.
83 See, e.g., Greater St. Louis Constr. Laborers Welfare Fund v. A Shining Store, Inc., 547 F.
Supp. 2d 997, 998 (E.D. Mo. 2008) (award of $62,347.16 in contributions and $40,046.07 in
liquidated damages); Gastronomical Workers Union Local 610 v. Posadas de P. R. Assocs., 544 F.
Supp. 2d 89, 92 (D.P.R. 2008) (award of $27,189.76 in contributions, $45,390.70 in liquidated
damages, and $12,539.67 in interest); Trs. of the Mich. Reg'1 Council of Carpenters v. Accura
Concrete Walls, Inc., 408 F. Supp. 2d 370, 373 (E.D. Mich. 2005) (award of $83,960.16 in contri-
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set by the trustees.84 In addition, the trustees can structure the plans to disfavor
members of the association who lack lines of credit to ensure regular pay-
ments.8 5
If not for union participation, all of this policing of competition would
be wildly illegal under the antitrust laws.86  However, because Congress has
sought to protect workers' rents through the payment of higher wages, labor
antitrust exemptions have arisen, both via statute and via the courts, to protect
the system.87  Although this Article argues that the problems of union-
association cartel behavior are better addressed through the labor laws, a brief
review of the labor antitrust exemptions is now in order to illustrate both the
problem of union-association cartels, and why an antitrust solution to the cartels
is not desirable.
III. THE LABOR ANTITRUST EXEMPTIONS
The extent to which antitrust law regulates union activities is one of the
oldest legal questions of labor relations. A union that controls the bargaining
rights for an employer's workforce holds monopoly power over the provision of
88labor to the employer. Therefore, a simple ban on
"monopolies" would outlaw unions that successfully organize employers. Thus,
if unions are allowed to operate, but monopolies are to be banned, or at least
regulated, some exemption must be made for union organizing and bargaining.
Striking a balance between the two policies of promoting collective
bargaining and promoting competition became a federal issue with the passage
of the Sherman Act in 1890.89 Although it is doubtful that the Sherman Act was
originally intended to apply to unions, the Supreme Court interpreted it as doing
so early on in the Act's history. 90 Congress haphazardly reacted against this
with language in the Clayton Act,91passed in 1914, and the Norris-LaGuardia
8 See supra, notes 48-58.
85 See supra, notes 74-76.
86 Campbell, supra note 30, at 1042.
87 Lande & Zerbe, supra note 18, at 210 (stating that Congress's primary goal with labor legis-
lation is to protect workers' rents).
88 See supra, note 40 and accompanying text.
89 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006)) ("Every contract, combination
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the sev-
eral States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.").
9 Lande & Zerbe, supra note 18, at 202.
9' See 38 Stat. 731 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2006)) ("The labor of a human
being is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be
construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organiza-
tions, instituted for the purposes of mutual help, and not having capital stock or conducted for
profit, or to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully carrying
out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof, be held or
354 [Vol. 113
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Act,92in 1932, which protects unions to some extent from the Sherman Act's
reach. Initial Supreme Court opinions limited the reach of this "statutory ex-
emption," 93 but the labor-friendly New Deal Court later interpreted the exemp-
tion to protect unions from most of the reach of antitrust law when the unions
are engaged in monopolizing the labor market.94
The first important New Deal labor antitrust opinion was Apex Hosiery
Co. v. Leader in 1940.9' There, a union demanded a closed-shop and refused to
allow the shipment of goods, including goods to out-of-state customers.9 6 The
employer refused these demands, and the union members engaged in a sit-down
strike.97 The Court reversed a damages award against the union, ruling that "the
[Sherman] [A]ct did not apply to strikes or other obstructions to interstate com-
merce unless [the activity] had an effect, or [was] intended to have an effect, on
prices." 98 Because the union was merely trying to organize, and because there
was no demonstrated effect on prices in the record, the Court found the union's
actions exempt from the Sherman Act.99 The Court was less than clear, howev-
er, as it also discussed the permissibility of monopolizing labor across an indus-
try whatever the effect on prices. 00 As many labor actions will have an effect
on prices, the rule of the case was thus unclear. However, the Court suggested a
clarification the next year in United States v. Hutcheson, where it flatly stated
that union activity is exempt from the Sherman Act "[s]o long as a union acts in
its self-interest and does not combine with non-labor groups .. io.
Apex Hosiery raised the question, however, of what happens when a un-
ion does "combine" with non-labor groups, as it must whenever it bargains with
employers. In 1945, with Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,102 the Court attempted an answer, but the
construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust
laws.").
92 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 101, et seq. (2006)) (outlawing yellow
dog contracts and depriving federal courts of jurisdiction to issue injunctions in labor disputes).
93 See, e.g., Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295 (1925) (upholding
treble damages judgment against union).
94 See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
9 Id.
96 Id. at 481-82.
97 Id. at 482.
9 Meltzer, supra note 20, at 666; see also Apex Hosiery, 310 U.S. at 499-501.
9 Apex Hosiery, 310 U.S. at 501.
'0 See id. at 504 ("[A]n elimination of price competition based on differences in labor stan-
dards is the objective of any national labor organization. But this effect on competition has not
been considered to be the kind of curtailment of price competition prohibited by the Sherman
Act.").
1o1 312 U.S. 219, 232 (1941).
102 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
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answer was rather unclear. 0 3 In that case, the New York City electricians un-
ion, Local 3, organized both local electrical equipment manufacturers and local
electrical contractors.'1 The manufacturers agreed only to sell to local contrac-
tors organized by Local 3, and the contractors agreed only to buy from the same
local manufacturers.' 0 5 Local 3, in turn, used traditional labor methods of boy-
cotting and picketing to keep nonunion firms out of the market.'06 This allowed
the employers to raise prices and for the unions to enjoy higher wages while
working less hours. 0 7 As outlined above,' 08 the employers thus were in control
of a classic cartel policed by a labor union.lo9
The Court determined that Local 3 was not exempt from the antitrust
laws because the businesses it contracted with were engaged in a conspiracy and
"[a] business monopoly is no less such because a union participates, and such
participation is a violation of the Act." 0 This, however, could mean all manner
of things. For example, in a multiemployer bargaining agreement, employers-
in agreeing on what wages they will pay their various employees-by definition
agree with each other to fix labor prices. If the firms were not unionized this
would violate the Sherman Act as a restraint on trade. Under Allen Bradley,
does it violate the Sherman Act even if a union is involved? Hardly, considering
the Court's acceptance of multiemployer bargaining in other contexts."' How-
ever, this is a potential implication of Allen Bradley due to its expansive lan-
guage.
The confusion over the labor exemption only increased in 1965 with the
twin cases of United Mine Workers v. Penningtonll2 and Local Union No. 189,
Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co. " Each case resulted in three opi-
nions on behalf of three justices.114 In Jewel Tea, six justices concluded that the
agreement the union and other employers negotiated was exempt from the
103 See, e.g., Meltzer, supra note 20, at 46-49 (discussing how to draw a principled line be-
tween exempt and non-exempt labor activities under Allen Bradley).
10 Allen Bradley, 325 U.S. at 799.
105 Id
106 Id
107 Id. at 800 ("Wages went up, hours were shortened, and the New York electrical equipment
prices soared, to the decided financial profit of local contractors and manufacturers.").
1 See supra, Part II.B.
'0 See Leslie, supra note 33, at 1202 ("To establish a cartel, competitors can deal directly or
they can hire an agent. Local 3 was no less an agent because it was a union.").
no Allen Bradley, 325 U.S. at 811.
' See, e.g., NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449, 353 U.S. 87, 95-96 (1957) (recog-
nizing multiemployer bargaining as allowed by labor legislation).
112 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
11 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
114 Pennington included an "Opinion of the Court" on behalf of six justices, but three separately
concurred with a more limited opinion. Jewel Tea had no "Opinion of the Court" at all.
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Sherman Act." 5 The Chicago butchers union and most of its employers had
agreed to forbid the selling of meat from 6:00 p.m. to 9:00 a.m.'1 6 The opinion
of Justice White concluded that the provision properly related to the labor mar-
ket, and not the product market, as it concerned when butchers could work as
well as a task-handling meat-that the butchers could lawfully protect from
other bargaining units."' Further, the challenging employer, Jewel, did not al-
lege that the union and the other employers had conspired to hurt Jewel through
this provision.' Justice Goldberg's concurrence also found no violation, but
simply argued that mandatory subjects of bargaining, such as working hours,
should be per se immune from antitrust law and that a purpose to conspire is
irrelevant."19
In Pennington, the same trio of justices led by Justice White in Jewel
Tea issued an "Opinion of the Court" that found a union-association contract to
not be exempted from the Sherman Act.12 0 The trio of justices led by Justice
Douglas wrote separately, but the extent of what both opinions held to be non-
exempted behavior is telling. The case concerned the United Mine Workers
who negotiated a contract with an association of large employers.121 The union
agreed to allow some automation of the employers' mining operations, which
would lead to lower employment but would also generally raise wages.122 In
return, the union agreed to negotiate contracts with certain non-association
smaller employers that would effectively drive those smaller employers from
the market.123 Thus, the union and the large employers agreed to suppress com-
petition.
Justice White suggested that a multiemployer bargaining agreement
does not violate the antitrust laws simply because it levels wages between em-
ployers.124 Thus, if all association employers agree to pay the same wages, there
is no antitrust violation. However, the policy underlying an exemption for bar-
gaining between one group of employers and a union does not extend to control-
ling bargaining between the union and another group of employers.12 5 Said
Justice White,
" 381 U.S. at 690.
116 Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 680.
" Id. at 689-90.
1 Id. at 688 (declining to disturb district court finding that no conspiracy existed).
119 Id. at 719-20 (Goldberg, A., concurring).
120 Pennington, 381 U.S. at 659.
121 Id. at 659-60.
122 Id. at 660.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 664.
125 Id. at 655-56.
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[T]here is nothing in the labor policy indicating that the union
and the employers in one bargaining unit are free to bargain
about the wages, hours and working conditions of other bar-
gaining units or to attempt to settle these matters for the entire
industry . . . . The union's obligation to its members would
seem best served if the union retained the ability to respond to
each bargaining situation as the individual circumstances might
warrant, without being strait-jacketed by some prior agreement
with the favored employers. 12 6
Thus, Justice White concluded that because the contract between the
large mining employers and the United Mine Workers required the union to
seek certain wages from smaller employers, the contract was not exempt from
the antitrust laws. 12 7
Justice White's opinion did not require the union and large employers to
have any intent to conspire against the smaller employers for the antitrust ex-
emption not to apply.12 8 Justice Douglas's concurrence, however, did require
this extra step. He stated that the case should be remanded for a new trial where
the jury should be instructed to find prima facie evidence of an antitrust viola-
tion if the "employers and the union agreed on a wage scale that exceeded the
financial ability of some operators to pay and if it was made for the purpose of
forcing some employers out of business . . ..
What is striking about Justice White's opinion is that based on its lan-
guage, any multiemployer agreement with an MFN would violate the antitrust
laws. Only Justice Douglas's requirement of "intent" to harm other employers
saves this conclusion. As will be seen below, this additional piece of potentially
messy evidence has allowed MFNs to continue to be used in multiemployer
agreements and has meant that antitrust law is not a practical solution to an in-
dividual employer who wants to break free of its association.
The antitrust implications of MFNs were further addressed in 1975 in
Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100.130
There, through picketing, a union pressured a general contractor to sign an
agreement-not a collective bargaining agreement-that required the general
contractor to only subcontract to employers signatory to the union, Local 100.131
In a rather incomplete opinion for the Court, Justice Powell stated that the
agreement "would not follow naturally from the elimination of competition over
wages and working conditions. It contravenes antitrust policies to a degree not
126 Id. at 666.
127 United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 669 (1965).
128 Id. at 665-66.
129 Id. at 672-73 (Douglas, J., concurring).
130 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
131 Id. at 619-20.
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justified by congressional labor policy, and therefore cannot claim a nonstatuto-
ry exemption from the antitrust laws."l 32 The agreement did not merely elimi-
nate competition over wages, an acceptable union goal under the labor antitrust
exemptions, because it prevented subcontractors who paid Local 100's wage
rates but had not signed with Local 100.133 Thus, it protected Local 100 qua
Local 100, not just Local 100's goal of eliminating wage competition. 134 The
Court also noted that Local 100 had an association agreement with an MFN.131
The association members and Local 100 would gain from the agreement with
the general contractor, as that agreement would increase the association mem-
bers' chance to win a subcontract with the general contractor.13 6 The Court rec-
ognized that the union's legitimate goal was to organize other subcontractors,
and implied that the MFN itself was therefore legal, but ruled that the union
could not make nonunion subcontractors ineligible for work through direct
means such as agreements with several contractors.' 37 The Court did hint, how-
ever, that if the agreement had been a collective bargaining agreement, and thus
that Local 100 represented the general's employees, that it might be allowed.13 8
It emphasized that the general did not employ any Local 100 members, and thus
the union did not deal with it in a representational capacity, but merely in an
economic capacity.139
Connell therefore highlighted the anticompetitive effects of MFNs, but
further insulated them from antitrust liability when they are wrapped within
collective bargaining agreements. Connell also reaffirmed that there are two
labor antitrust exemptions: the "statutory exemption" of sections 6 and 20 of the
Clayton Act plus the injunction bar of Norris-LaGuardia, and the "nonstatutory
exemption" which bars courts from considering the liability of unions and/or
employers when they bargain to allegedly restrain trade.140 This solved some of
the worries of Allen Bradley,14' by recognizing that unions regularly do act in
concert with employers, and that for collective bargaining agreements to survive
under the antitrust laws those actions need some level of antitrust immunity.142
132 Pennington, 381 U.S. at 626.
133 Id. at 623-24.
134 Id. at 624.
135 Id. at 619.
136 Id. at 623-24.
137 Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 625
(1975) ("This kind of direct restraint on the business market has substantial anticompetitive ef-
fects, both actual and potential, that would not follow naturally from the elimination of competi-
tion over wages and working conditions.").
138 Id. at 626.
" Id. at 631.
140 Id. at 621-22.
141 See supra notes 92-101 and accompanying text.
142 Connell, 421 U.S. at 622.
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The nonstatutory exemption was given further breadth in Brown v. Pro
Football, Inc..143 Although not directly relevant to MFNs, the case illustrates a
wide-open understanding of the nonstatutory exemption. There, the National
Football League's employers association bargained with the NFL players' un-
ion, and when both sides were unable to reach a CBA, the association imple-
mented its final offer.'" Certain players, who under that final offer were paid
less than their alleged market wage, sued arguing that the employers illegally
colluded to pay the wages and that the nonstatutory exemption did not apply
because the union did not agree to the terms of employment.14 5 In a ruling with
implications far beyond professional sports, the Court stated that the nonstatuto-
ry exemption extends to the members of a multiemployer association when they
act in concert regarding the labor market, even when the union does not agree to
those actions. 14 6 Analogizing from the single-employer context, the Court rea-
soned that post-impasse negotiations are an integral part of collective bargain-
ing, and that in the multiemployer bargaining context, not extending the nonsta-
tutory exemption to the post-impasse period would effectively ban post-impasse
multiemployer bargaining.14 7
With this understanding of the broad reach of the labor antitrust exemp-
tions in mind, a question relevant to this Article arises: Are unions and associa-
tion members immune from a conspiracy charge if they know the terms they
negotiate will hurt some members of the association, not employers outside of
the association, and if they are, how can a disadvantaged member of the associa-
tion defeat that immunity? In other words, can an association, with a union's
help, be guilty of conspiring against itself?
The combined opinions of Justice White and Justice Douglas in Pen-
nington suggest that a union-association conspiracy can violate the antitrust
laws if the complaining employers are outside of the association. Employers
technically inside of the association would assumedly have a harder claim. Jus-
tice White's implicit ruling against MFN clauses is premised on the fact that
employers outside of the association are not involved in union-association bar-
gaining even though such bargaining effectively dictates the non-association
employers' own bargaining terms. 14 8 However, this reasoning does not apply to
an employer in the association because the member can bargain. It just might
be overruled by its association colleagues. An association member can, howev-
er, withdraw from the association and then bargain directly with the union. At
such a time it could then raise a Pennington-type claim.
143 518 U.S. 231 (1996).
144 See id. at 234.
145 See id at 235.
14 Id. at 250.
147 See id. at 241-42.
148 See supra, notes 113-115 and accompanying text.
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Therefore, for a disgruntled association member who sees himself as a
victim of union-association conspiracy, the antitrust laws offer some measure of
protection, but the employer will have to first withdraw from the association,
bargain with the union, and then if it finds its bargaining compromised through
a conspiracy, file an antitrust action. As outlined below, this could take over
three years from the time the employer feels "outnumbered" by its association
colleagues to the time it can technically bargain directly with the union, but
practically cannot do so because of the conspiracy.149
How much recourse the employer may actually have under the antitrust
laws is a big unknown. As is argued below, even if there may be some cause of
action for such cartel behavior, antitrust law will be largely ineffective for an
individual employer trying to fight the combined strength of a union and associ-
ation. A smoking gun demonstrating Justice Douglas's required intent from
Pennington will be a rare find. A much more straightforward and speedy resolu-
tion, however, is to use the labor laws to assist the employer.
IV. THE DIFFICULTIES EMPLOYERS FACE IN EXITING MULTIEMPLOYER
ASSOCIATIONS
The most important legal rule governing multiemployer bargaining is
that it is voluntary.5 o Although an employer must bargain collectively with a
union once that union has been certified as the employees' bargaining represent-
ative, the employer is free to either bargain one-on-one with the union or, if the
union also desires, to bargain through an employer representative (the employer
association).' 5 A major exception to this rule is that once bargaining on a new
CBA has commenced, an employer who previously assigned its rights to an
employer representative cannot withdraw that assignment until the union and
association sign a new CBA.152 This even includes the time after the association
149 See supra, note 137 and accompanying text. Of course, for an employer without prior asso-
ciation, membership the route to an antitrust action would be shorter.
1so See, e.g., AM. BAR Ass'N SECTION OF LABOR & EMP'T LAW, supra note 17, at 716 ("The
formation of the unit must be entirely voluntary, the assent of the union having representative
status also being required. The Board will not approve the creation of such a unit over the objec-
tion of any party, union or employer."); Leslie, supra note 33, at 415-16 (recognizing the impor-
tance of voluntariness in multiemployer bargaining); Wial, supra note 22, at 714 ("It is an unfair
labor practice for a union to strike or threaten to strike in order to compel an employer to partici-
pate in multiemployer bargaining.").
151 Comment, supra note 35, at 697 (noting that "[b]ecause national labor policy presumptively
favors individual bargaining, the Board will certify multi-employer units only if both the associa-
tion members and the union manifest 'an unequivocal intention to be bound in collective bargain-
ing by group rather than individual action"' (quoting Joseph McDaniel, 226 N.L.R.B. 851, 852
(1976))).
152 See Retail Assocs., 120 N.L.R.B. 388 (1958). The exception to this exception is if there
exist "unusual circumstances." This only applies in cases of "bankruptcy, forced plant closure in
a single and perhaps a multiple-plan operation, and the loss of an entire uniquely-qualified work-
force where no replacements are available." Richard A. Bock, Note, Multiemployer Bargaining &
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and union have reached an impasse and the employers have implemented their
final offer.15 3 Therefore, an employer must weigh whether or not to continue to
assign its bargaining rights well ahead, perhaps years ahead, of the signing of
the final CBA, and before the employers and the union even begin the give-and-
take that shapes a labor agreement.154 Thus, whether or not to leave an associa-
tion is a choice an employer must weigh carefully.
However, although the Board has repeatedly emphasized the importance
of the voluntary nature of multiemployer bargaining, this voluntariness is illu-
sionary. Even if an employer carefully decides that it wishes to leave the asso-
ciation and bargain directly with the union it will only be able to obtain the same
terms as it could within the association. Such a choice threatens the cartel, and
therefore the cartel will do what it can to maintain the status quo. For this the
cartel has many options at its disposal. These options were outlined above, but
are discussed in detail below.
A. Most-Favored-Nations Clauses
First and foremost, the union-association CBA may contain a MFN bar-
ring the union from agreeing to more favorable terms with other employers,
even employers who are not members of the association. 55 As the labor anti-
trust cases make clear, MFNs are common in unionized multiemployer indus-
tries.156 They are a cartel's number one tool against employer exit. In order to
protect its product-market premium, an association can insist on an MFN so that
any unionized competitors (which, if the union is effective in organizing will
mean nearly all competitors) have to pay as high of wages and benefits as asso-
ciation members. When a non-association employer then tries to bargain with
the union, the union will be handcuffed to the terms in the association con-
tract. '5 If the union actually does agree to allow the non-association employer
to pay a lower wage, all association members will automatically also be allowed
to pay that lower wage.' 58 Given the unpopularity the union's leadership would
suddenly encounter among the membership if this happened, the union will not
agree to breach the MFN and will, very rationally, allow an employer to go
without a contract rather than agree to lower wages than association employers
receive.
Withdrawing from the Association after Bargaining has Begun: 38 Years of 'Unusual Circums-
tances' under Retail Associates, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 519, 543 (1996).
153 See Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404, 404 (1982).
154 See Bock, supra note 152, at 521.
1s See Richmond Elec. Servs., Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. 1001, 1001 (2006).
156 Winter, supra note 39, at 22.
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The following from the NLRB's Richmond Electrical Services, Inc. 5 9 is
an example of the effect of a MFN. In that case, a non-association member bar-
gained with a union whose association contract contained an MFN.1o The em-
ployer offered a lower wage than the association paid, and the union would not
agree to it.' 6 1 The union then alleged the employer's resulting implementation
of its final offer as an unfair labor practice. The Board denied that charge be-
cause the employer understood that there was no likelihood the union would
accept less than the association wage:
In this case, the Union conceded that the most-favored nation
clauses in the Union's other collective-bargaining agreements
effectively precluded it from agreeing with the Respondent on a
wage that was lower than the one in the [Association] agree-
ment. If the Union agreed to grant the Respondent a lower wage
than the [Association] wage, the Union would have had to offer
the lower wage to 64 other electrical contractors with whom it
had contractual relations. Thus, a lower contractual wage for the
Respondent's small number of bargaining unit employees
would have lowered the wages that hundreds of union members
would earn at other local electrical contractors.16 2
Because of the threat a lower wage for one employer posed to the entire
membership, the Board concluded that the employer and the union were at an
impasse when they could not agree on a wage rate.163
As Richmond Electrical Services illustrates, because wages and fringe
benefits rates are the most important labor terms that employers bargain for, an
MFN makes any real negotiation between a union and a non-association em-
ployer impossible. Instead of taking the typical weeks or months, a bargaining
session could only last a matter of minutes. The negotiation might proceed as
follows:
Employer Agent: Hi, I'd like to negotiate a collective bargain-
ing agreement between my company and the union.
Union Agent: Great. Well, this year we bargained with the as-
sociation a $35 per hour economic package of wages and bene-
fits.
15 Id. at 1001.
160 id
161 Id.
162 RichmondElec. Sers., 348 N.L.R.B. at 1002.
163 Id. at 1003.
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Employer Agent: I know, those association wages were too
much for my company, that's why we left. How about we bar-
gain to only pay $30 per hour?
Union Agent: Sorry, I can only give you as good of terms as the
association got. $35, take it or leave it.
Employer Agent: Well, I guess we're at an impasse.
And as long as the employer's statement regarding what it could afford
was made in good faith, the parties truly would be at an impasse. The impasse
might not come immediately, as the union might try and give the independent
employer a non-economic concession in return for agreeing to the association's
wage rates (although even that might be precluded by the MFN), but if a union
holds fast to its MFN any agreement is doomed.164
Once an impasse is at hand the employer can implement its final offer,
in the above hypothetical $30 per hour, and go ahead and work without a con-
tract. The union might file an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB, but
unless the employer really could afford $35 per hour and its impasse statement
was in bad faith, the NLRB would likely refuse to issue a complaint, or its com-
plaint would not stand at a hearing because a true impasse was at hand.165 Thus,
the employer would be placed in the position of employing its all-union work-
force, but without a contract. The union and employer could always come back
to the bargaining table, as an impasse does not end a collective bargaining rela-
tionship but merely is a pause between negotiations.16 6 However, with the MFN
looming above them it is unlikely that bargaining any time in the near future
would be fruitful.
Indeed, unions recognize that MFNs impair their ability to bargain with
non-association employers, and therefore often resist them in bargaining.'6 1 It is
'" See, e.g., J.D. Lunsford Plumbing, Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc., 254 N.L.R.B. 1360,
1371 (1981).
165 See, e.g., Richmond Electrical Servs., Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. at 1001; JD. Lunsford Plumbing,
254 N.L.R.B. at 1371 ("[I]t was clear that the Union would not permit terms that would under-
mine the Association contract by application of the most-favored-nations clause of that contract.
It was equally clear that the Company would not meet the terms of the new Association contract.
With that basic difference between them there was little point in further discussion and an impasse
had been reached.").
'6 See, e.g., Bonanno Linen Serv., Inc., 243 N.L.R.B. 1093, 1094 (1979).
167 See, e.g., California Pie Co., Inc., 329 N.L.R.B. 968, 974 (1999) (union rejected employer's
proposed MFN); Atlas Transit Mix Corp., 323 N.L.R.B. 1144, 1147 (1997) (noting that "the As-
sociation's members expressed vehement insistence on 'going to the wall,' on obtaining the same
conditions" as the other employers including a most-favored-nations clause); Hayward Dodge,
Inc., 292 N.L.R.B. 434, 448 (1989) (stating that the union's agents testified that the union's Inter-
national "had encountered a lot of problems with [MFNs] in the retail food industry" and that "the
Union would never agree to it").
[Vol. 1 13364
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likely that such union resistance is stronger the more competitive an industry is,
as in a relatively non-competitive market unions will have less independent em-
ployers to worry about. 168
If "escape" from an association contract were as easy as bargaining to
impasse in the face of an MFN, as outlined above, associations would not be as
powerful as they are today. However, additional obstacles prevent exit. The
union will be enlisted to apply its various tools to put pressure on the employer
and not let it simply walk away. One tactic, of course, is to strike. A strike in
such a situation would not be a whipsaw strike as the union would not be apply-
ing pressure on one employer and hoping to use it on another next.1 69 It would
have the same lopsided character, however, because the union could dip into its
strike fund, subsidized through dues from members who work for association
employers, to assist the striking employees. 7 0 The union would then picket the
employer, hoping other trades follow its picket line and shut down the operation
of the employer, encouraging other employers to cease doing business with it.
Of course, the actual employees of the employer might not want to
strike. In the above example, if the employer truly cannot afford the $35 eco-
nomic package the employees might understand this, particularly with a small
employer where information is more easily understood and communicated
throughout the company. They may understand that a long strike would be use-
less as they know the union can only agree to a $35 contract and their employer
will not.
If the employees refuse their union's order to strike, the union can then
put pressure on the employer in other ways, such as Area Standards picketing,
or, in the construction and apparel industries, through using the secondary pres-
sure allowed to it under the exceptions to section 8(e) of the NLRA.17 ' The un-
ion can also discipline the employees for working for non-union employers.172
Also, for employers involved in public jobs-especially in construction-
federal, state, and local governments have implemented policies that make it
very difficult for non-union companies to compete, including project-labor
agreements on certain public works projects where the public entity agrees to
168 See Winter, supra note 39, at 18 (explaining how multiemployer bargaining is more advan-
tageous for unions and employers in less competitive industries).
169 See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text (describing whipsaw strikes).
170 See Note, supra note 37, at 510 (discussing strike funds).
171 See Victory Mkts., Inc., 322 N.L.R.B. 17, 18 & n.5 (1996) (discussing consumer boycott
and area standards picketing, which attempts to convince employer to raise wages and work con-
ditions to union norm for the area); 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (2006) (allowing construction industry
CBAs to require signatory employers use unionized subcontractors and allowing exemptions from
secondary-boycott ban for unions in the apparel and clothing industry).
172 Gail Frommer, Hoorayfor ... Toronto? Hollywood, Collective Bargaining, & Extraterri-
torial Union Rules in an Era of Globalization, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 55, 95-96 (2003) (de-
scribing how a union can punish members for working for non-union employers).
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only use union employers. 173 It also includes prevailing wage laws, the Davis-
Bacon Act and various state equivalents ("Little Davis-Bacon Acts"), that in
practice require contractors on public works to pay union wages and benefits.174
These laws have quite an effect, as "public construction accounts for between
one-fifth and one-quarter of all construction" in the country.175 Since these pre-
vailing wages and benefits are often what union employers pay anyway, non-
union employers are effectively unable to compete according to their own busi-
ness models. Thus, the employer from the above hypothetical would be re-
quired to pay $35 per hour for public work just as the collective bargaining
agreement already requires even if it did not negotiate such a collective bargain-
ing agreement.
If an employer is able to survive a strike, picketing, secondary pressure,
and public works favoritism; however, it will then be in a position where the
union can be decertified as its employees' bargaining representative if its em-
ployees are no longer supportive. They might have wished that the union did
something tangible for them, such as bargain for $32 per hour, but since the
union was in an all-or-nothing bargaining position, it ended up failing to further
their interests. If the employees do not vote to decertify, the employer may also
merely wait the three or more years for the association agreement to be renego-
tiated, and at that time assess whether it can agree to the new wage package.
Thus, the MFN can help the cartel-the non-association employer may be put
out of business along the way-but is bad for the employer, and bad for the em-
ployer's union employees, as they may either be out of a job or out of a union.
B. Taft-Hartley Plans
Multiemployer Taft-Hartley plans are extremely valuable to a union's
and the cartel's interests. In addition to MFNs, the plans allow the cartel to limit
association withdrawal. Because the membership of an employer's workforce,
within a bargaining unit, belongs to the same union, and because multiemployer
unions generally demand that their members be able to participate in the same
plans across the various employers they bargain with, 7 6 unionized employers
1 See, e.g., Laborers Local No. 942 v. Lampkin, 956 P.2d 422, 439 (Alaska 1998) (upholding
project labor agreement requiring employers on school construction job to sign with local unions);
see generally David J. Langworthy, Project-Labor Agreements After Boston Harbor: Do They
Violate Competitive Bidding Laws?, 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1103 (1996).
174 See, e.g., Sarah Dunn, John M. Quigley & Larry A. Rosenthal, The Effects of Prevailing
Wage Requirements on the Cost of Low-Income Housing, 59 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 141, 142
(2005) (stating that the federal Davis-Bacon Act and California's equivalent "usually result[] in
the selection of a negotiated wage rate (under a union collective bargaining agreement)").
1s Daniel P. Kessler & Lawrence F. Katz, Prevailing Wage Laws & Construction Labor Mar-
kets, 54 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 259, 259 (2001).
176 See Harper, supra note 40, at 1681 (discussing how group benefit programs are possible
because of multiemployer bargaining); Comment, supra note 35, at 693 n.23 (discussing unions'
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will have little, if any, choice to not participate in the union's Taft-Hartley
plans. The union will not agree to a CBA that does not require the employer to
contribute to the plans. This is a large reason for the existence of Taft-Hartley
plans in the first place: they allow union members to change employers without
losing pension credits and healthcare coverage.'177 This is especially true for
defined benefit pension funds17 8 in industries with an inherently transient work-
force, such as the construction industry. Defined benefit plans require years of
participation to vest for a pension,17 9 and when that fact is coupled with working
in an industry where employees often work for an employer no longer than a
particular project, the union's perceived need for a multiemployer benefit appa-
ratus becomes acute. This can also apply to health and welfare plans, where
benefits often accrue on a quarterly basis, because workers often change em-
ployers mid-quarter and need hours from each employer to retain eligibility, or
need an "hour bank" to keep their coverage intact during a seasonal break in
employment. 80 With their members' interests in mind, unions in such indus-
tries will be very reticent to turn over, through collective bargaining, their mem-
bers' benefits to single employer plans or plans in which other signatory em-
ployers do not participate. The union and its members will instead demand par-
ticipation in multiemployer plans, or at least plans that reciprocate coverage
with the union's Taft-Hartley plans, by all signatory employers.
Furthermore, unless a majority181 of an employer association's members
do not want to participate in the multiemployer plans, the association, in addi-
reasons for participating in multiemployer bargaining); Comment, supra note 27, at 561 (stating
that pooling of employer contributions make benefit plans and apprenticeship programs possible).
17 See David Blumenstein & Clifford H. Routh, Multiemployer Defined Benefit Pension Plans:
Why Their Future Looks Strong, 44 BENEFITS & COMPENSATION DIGEST No. 11, 26, 29 (Nov. 1,
2007) (explaining that bargained employees value the portability of Taft-Hartley pension plans
across employers).
17s Although now disfavored among the non-unionized workforce, and in single employer
plans, defined benefit plans are still very popular, and not in numerical decline, among multiem-
ployer unionized workforces. See id. at 26-27 (stating that unlike single employer defined benefit
plans, multiemployer defined benefit plans are not declining in popularity, climbing from 8.2
million participating members in 1985 to 9.9 million in 2005); see also Gentile, supra note 76, at
350 n.9 ("These funds provide benefits to approximately 10 million participants in the United
States. When spouses and dependents are included, the number of persons served by multiem-
ployer plans increases to approximately 30 million.").
Under ERISA, the maximum number of years a plan can require for vesting for a defined
benefit pension is five. 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2006).
180 For examples of "hour bank" programs see Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Assoc. v. Mahoning
& Trumbull Cnty. Bldg. Trades Welfare Fund, 541 F.2d 636, 638 n.1 (6th Cir. 1976), and McCabe
v. Trombley, 867 F. Supp. 120, 122 (N.D.N.Y. 1994).
18 Whether a mathematical "majority" will be needed or not will be up to the association itself.
There is no strict rule on what percentage of an association's membership must agree to a pro-
posed CBA to effectuate signature. However, what is clear is that 100% is not required, so a
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tion to the union, will bargain to keep the Taft-Hartley plan apparatus. If an
employer chooses to bargain individually, the union will bargain strongly for the
employer to continue to participate in the plans. The union then has the full
force of tactics discussed above, including a strike.' 82
Of course, an employer could seek to continue to contribute to the
plans, even as it bargains for concessions on wages. An employer may want to
negotiate for lower contributions in addition to lower wages. In that case, the
employer could seek to negotiate a side-agreement with the plan giving it differ-
ent terms than the other participating employers, including lower contributions.
However, the plan and its trustees would have little, if any, incentive to recog-
nize such an agreement, especially if it at all jeopardized the financial health of
the plan. Even if the union allows the employer to negotiate more favorable
fringe benefit terms, such as lower contribution rates or lower liquidated dam-
ages rates, the trustees of the plan might not allow this as they may, in their ac-
tual (or purported) fiduciary judgment, believe it is not in the best interests of
the plan's participants and beneficiaries. As trustees are supposed to administer
a plan solely in order to provide benefits for the plan's participants and benefi-
ciaries, providing an employer better terms than others might very well bump up
against the trustees' fiduciary duties.'8 3  Considering the potential fiduciary
breach and accompanying personal trustee liability 84 that a side agreement
might create, trustees will be extremely hesitant to grant an employer indivi-
dually-negotiated terms with the plan. Even if the employer and union bargain
for decreased benefits in return for lower contributions, this would require the
trustees to craft a two-tiered plan structure-whether for health care or
pension-for only one, or perhaps a few other, employers. This is something
that the trustees would likely consider not worth their time or the plan's money.
This is especially true if they are keeping the cartel's interests in mind.
Now, since Taft-Hartley plans are jointly controlled by labor and man-
agement, it could be argued that individual employers have a voice in their
structure because management, as a whole, can seek to amend the plan to better
serve employers, such as keeping contribution levels low or limiting liquidated
damages on late contributions. However, structural conditions weigh against
this. This possibility is only available if a majority of employers in an associa-
tion want to change the plan and if they then can either convince labor's repre-
182 See supra Part IV.A. (discussing tactics used against withdrawing employers).
183 See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2006). "[A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to
a plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and-
(A) for the exclusive purpose of:
(i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and
(ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan."
Id. It is hard to see how allowing a class of participants (the individual employer's employees) to
receive equal benefits for lower contributions would not violate the trustees' fiduciary duties.
' See id. § 1109(a).
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sentatives to change the plan or win against them in arbitration in the case of a
deadlock.18 5 As members of the cartel, employers in control of the association's
trustees will prefer the status quo for the very reason that it punishes a minority
of employer members, including the trustees' competitors. Therefore, an indi-
vidual employer who wishes to change the plan's terms has little or no power to
do so through the association, its bargaining representative, if a majority of its
fellow members do not agree with it. Its only option is to withdraw from the
association and try its luck against the union directly, and in so doing withdraw
from the cartel's plans altogether.
C. Withdrawal Liability
One further, and very important, reason that employers will be reluctant
to leave multiemployer plans, at least defined benefit pension plans,18 6 once they
have participated in one for any lengthy period of time is withdrawal liability.
In an effort to protect defined benefit plans from losing anticipated future
streams of contributions from the withdrawal of employers, the Multiemployer
Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 imposes liability against an employer
who permanently ceases to have an obligation to contribute to such a plan.18 7
The amount of the liability is based upon the employer's share of unfunded
vested benefits considering the plan's overall unfunded liabilities and the share
of those attributable to the employer.'8 8 Depending on an employer's past histo-
ry with a plan, and depending on the plan's actuarial health, the liability can be
quite onerous.18 9 Not only that, but the liability is imposed not just against the
signatory employer, but against all trades or businesses under its common con-
trol.190 Therefore, if the employer is owned by a predominant shareholder, that
individual may not be able to shield other businesses he has a controlling inter-
est in from a withdrawal liability action. For example, if an individual is the
sole owner of a participating employer in a steelworkers plan, and also is the
sole owner of a dry cleaning business, that dry cleaning business' assets will be
185 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5)(B) (2006) (providing for arbitration when the equal number of labor
and management trustees on a plan cannot agree on an issue). However, the association is struc-
tured, it could be that a supermajority is needed on aspects of bargaining. In any case, however,
there is a significant chance in any round of bargaining that a significant minority of employers
will be dissatisfied with terms in the finished CBA that a majority of employers are satisfied with.
186 Multiemployer defined benefit pension plans are still very popular, with approximately 9.9
million members as of 2005. See Blumenstein & Routh, supra note 177, at 26-27.
187 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1405 (2006)
188 Michael W. Kelly, Note, Multiemployer Pension Plan Withdrawal Liability: Limitations
Without Limits, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 255, 255 (1992).
189 See, e.g., Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal.,
508 U.S. 602 (1993).
19 29 U.S.C. § 1301(b)(1) (2006).
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subject to a withdrawal liability judgment against the steel company.191 This
adds an immense incentive for the steel company to not withdraw from a mul-
tiemployer defined benefit pension plan.
Thus, an employer has a number of reasons why association withdrawal
will be ineffective in bargaining for any terms other than those in the association
CBA. These include an MFN clause, union demands to continue participating
in its Taft-Hartley plans coupled with Trustee resistance to plan modification,
and withdrawal liability. Even if these are not enough, and the employer im-
plements its final offer, 192 the cartel's post-impasse tactics will make business
very difficult: a strike, picketing, secondary pressure, and public works discrim-
ination, to name a few.
This system makes a mockery of federal labor policy. That policy, first
and foremost, is supposed to encourage collective bargaining.' 93 It also suppo-
sedly allows, and protects, voluntary assignment, and withdrawal, of an em-
ployer's bargaining rights.194 The reality of multiemployer bargaining, at least
where MFNs are used, encourages the opposite: it provides no choice between
bargaining through an association or bargaining individually, and therefore en-
courages employers to refrain from using that right or, if they so chose anyway,
encourages them to sever their collective bargain relationship entirely. In effect
it encourages one of two outcomes: (1) an individual employer successfully
escaping its collective bargaining relationship because a union is unable, or un-
willing, to bargain with the employer on non-association terms, or (2) an indi-
vidual employer being forced to remain in an association where the union and
its competitors dictate its labor terms.
If the two policies of encouraging collective bargaining and allowing
employer choice in bargaining rights are to be protected, and if the anticompeti-
tive cartels of associations and unions acting together are to be tempered, there
must be a change in the current law regulating the interaction between the indi-
vidual employer, the union, and the association.
191 See Susan C. Glen, Comment, Central States v. Pers., Inc.: When Real Estate Investments
Create Personal Liability Under the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, 78
MINN. L. REV. 501, 509-14 (1993) (collecting cases).
192 See Craig Becker, "Better Than a Strike ": Protecting New Forms of Collective Work Stop-
pages Under the National Labor Relations Act, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 351, 361 (1994) (discussing
employer's right to implement its final offer after bargaining to impasse, as well as the union's
right to strike).
193 See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006) ("It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to
eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to miti-
gate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and
procedure of collective bargaining."); see also William M. Wiecek, America in the Post-War
Years: Transition & Transformation, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1203, 1216 (2000) (highlighting the
federal labor policy of favoring collective bargaining regimes).
19 See supra notes 150-55 and accompanying text.
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V. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
A. Antitrust
What solution exists? One recommended in the past has been to read
the nonstatutory labor antitrust exemption to not apply to MFNs.' 95 MFNs
would be a restraint of trade under the Sherman Act.196 The most straight-
forward justification for this is that MFNs are directed toward product-market
effects not labor market effects, making them naturally suited for antitrust liabil-
197
Ity.
One problem with an antitrust approach is that it does not help the union
employees of the individual employer. As we have seen, MFNs are trouble-
some not only because individual employers are unable to bargain with their
employees' unions, but because those employers' employees are unable to be
properly represented.198 An individual employer could bring an antitrust action
against the union and the association, and its members, and, A la Pennington,
perhaps successfully prove that there was a conspiracy to lower its profits
through leaving it with no option but to take the association wage rates.' 99
However, the individual employer also has the option, if it can survive a strike
and other union tactics, to implement its final offer and operate without a con-
tract, on the road to becoming non-union.200 The only other obstacle in its way
is withdrawal liability, and if it can afford this, or if it does not contribute to a
defined benefit pension plan anyway, then it may succeed. Although difficult,
this may be an easier road to go than an expensive antitrust suit against a union-
association cartel, notwithstanding potential treble damages. Further, an anti-
trust suit demands a finding that the union and association actually conspired to
put it out of business. 201 Given the paucity of successful Pennington-type cases
in the case law, it appears the route of "going non-union" is more practical than
challenging the entire union-employer apparatus through an antitrust suit, espe-
cially for a smaller employer.
In all this employees of the individual employer are those whose inter-
ests are least looked after. Although the employees will not receive the associa-
tion wage if their employer is able to bargain with their union, they might be
willing to settle for less-than association wages if they can keep participating in
1 Campbell, supra note 47, at 1042-43 (MFNs should be banned because they create product-
market effects, not "effects that follow naturally from a labor monopoly"); Winter, supra note 39,
at 71 (recommending banning MFNs under antitrust law).
196 Winter, supra note 39, at 71.
97 Campbell, supra note 47, at 1042-43.
1 See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
199 See supra note 129 and accompanying text (discussing needed proof for an antitrust claim).
200 This assumes that the individual employer has a good faith argument that it cannot afford
the association's wage package.
201 See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
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the union's benefit plans and still receive above-market wages (i.e. above non-
union wages), as well as other bargained-for benefits, e.g. overtime pay for Sat-
urday work, vacation pay, etc. However, since their union takes an all-or-
nothing approach in what can be bargained for, the employees are left with the
options of either using economic leverage, i.e. a strike and picketing, to force
their employer to accept the association CBA, and perhaps lose their jobs, or
rejecting their employer's final offer but continuing to work, thus working under
worse conditions than if they had tried to meet their employer halfway. Leaving
their union altogether as their bargaining unit representative is a plausible option
once this occurs because the union has refused to bargain with their employer.202
Thus, instead of the individual employer's employees bargaining for the
best they can extract out of their employer, the union and the association pre-
vent them from, practically speaking, collectively bargaining with their employ-
er at all. Antitrust law cannot help them. This is partly because it would be
difficult for employees to establish standing to sue for antitrust injuries when
their employer is also injured (which would be the case in an MFN situation)
203because the injury is indirect. In addition, even assuming they would have
standing, such a suit would have further difficulties. Given that the union would
likely not have breached its duty of fair representation regarding these em-
ployees-a union is not duty-bound to bargain for the best possible terms for all
of its members-it is hard to think how the union's members would have an
antitrust cause of action against their union where none exists under the labor
laws.204 Unions have wide latitude in crafting bargaining agreements and an
MFN very much may be a logical decision for the rest of the membership be-
cause, as a bargaining chip, it gives them a wage premium from what the asso-
ciation would otherwise pay. Since the same deference under duty of fair repre-
202 The employees could, of course, form and have certified their own "micro union" or join
another union that wants to take them into their fold (e.g. painters joining the laborers union be-
cause of an MFN in the painters' association CBA), but this will not only impede their flexibility
in moving to future employers (e.g. association painting companies) but may also imperil any
pension credits they have in their former defined benefit plan if they have not vested.
203 See Antitrust & Labor Relations Law, 4 LAB. LAW. 410, 411 (1988) (describing case law);
Air Courier Conference v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 498 U.S. 517, 528 n.5 (1991) (stating, in
dicta, that employees have been denied standing to assert antitrust claims); Adams v. Pan Am.
World Airways, Inc., 828 F.2d 24, 29 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("[I]n the absence of special circumstances
not present here, the cases provide no support for suit by employees of a firm victimized by anti-
trust violations."); N. Am. Energy Sys., LLC v. New Eng. Energy Mgmt., 269 F. Supp. 2d 12, 19
(D. Conn. 2002) ("It is well established that neither employees nor shareholders of a corporation,
much less prospective employees and shareholders, have standing to bring claims for antitrust
violations affecting the corporation." (emphasis in original)).
204 John E. Taylor, Helping Those Who Help Themselves: The Fourth Circuit's Treatment of
Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory Employment Discrimination Claims in Brown v. ABF Freight
Systems, Inc. & EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 79 N.C. L. REV. 239, 268 (2000) (stating, in the
context of labor arbitration, that a union "may legitimately trade off the interests of some members
against others in order to promote the greater good of the whole bargaining unit.").
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sentation cases that favor unions similarly favor employers in the same cases, 205
the same deference would likely apply to an antitrust case against an associa-
tion. Furthermore, even if the members could bring a successful antitrust action,
how practical such a suit would be, where the only loss would be the difference
in pay between their new wage package and the association scale, at treble dam-
ages admittedly, is very questionable.
B. The Labor Laws
Unlike antitrust, the labor laws do offer some promise to partially cor-
rect the vitiation of the federal labor policies of encouraging collective bargain-
ing and allowing employers to bargain individually. The following suggests a
few mechanisms through how this could work, and it emphasizes that these are
only suggestions and by no means the best possible route to better multiemploy-
er bargaining. That result will require further study, including empirical review
of multiemployer bargaining practices, of which there is precious little available
scholarship. These suggested protections will require some changes to current
Board law, but not necessarily changes to the labor statutes. There are addition-
al changes suggested regarding employee benefits, although these would require
Congressional amendment. The suggestions would by no means address all of
the problems discussed above, such as public works favoritism, but merely serve
as partial, yet important, solutions.
The actor which, under current law, defeats the dual federal policies of
promoting collective bargaining and of employer choice in selecting a bargain-
ing representative is not the association acting alone, nor the union acting alone.
It is the cartel which both of them include. Without the assistance of both par-
ties the maladies of multiemployer bargaining would not be nearly as acute.
Therefore, both the union and the association must understand that they have
contributed in creating an environment denying an individual employer the
chance to bargain individually, and of denying the employees of those employ-
ers a chance to realistically bargain with their employer. Both parties "own" the
state of affairs. In order to have one or both parties change their behavior, such
as not bargaining for an MFN clause or not creating a defined benefit plan that
imposes withdrawal liability, they must have an incentive to bargain differently.
Therefore, the union must understand that in acquiescing to the associa-
tion's demand for an MFN clause, it has created the conditions where employers
who want to withdraw from the association will either remain in the association
even though they may not economically survive the association CBA's terms
(and thus may lay union members off) or exit the association and risk a strike
which may lead, if they survive, to becoming non-union. Given the fact that
MFN clauses are widely used,206 unions are apparently willing to allow some
205 See LABOR UNION LAW & REGULATION 318 (William W. Osborn, Jr. ed. 2003).
206 See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
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employers to potentially become non-union in return for the trade-offs that asso-
ciations give in return during collective bargaining. As discussed above, unions
will sometimes fight against MFNs and generally will be more willing to agree
to MFNs the less non-union competition exists. 2 0 7
If the ease of leaving the association, and therefore the union, were
made easier, however, unions would be less willing to agree to MFN clauses.
Then unions would recover lower concessions from associations, with no MFN
to give in return, but would actually bargain with non-association employers
who could not afford association scale. The unions would therefore fully
represent their members employed by those non-association employers.
To make this strategy work it would have to be easier for an employer
to make the journey from association member to non-union competitor, or at
least a non-association member without a contract. It may sound counterintui-
tive that the path to making unions more responsive to their members is to make
it easier for employers to become non-union, but that is the case given the
above-discussed conditions. Giving employers more of a chance to leave the
union will give the union an incentive to not agree to an MFN clause, as well as
for the Taft-Hartley fund trustees to be less restrictive in their demands on con-
tributing employers.
Readers may object to this "incentivizing" approach and recommend
banning MFNs altogether under the labor laws. This perhaps may ultimately be
what is needed. However, the hope is that a less drastic approach that still al-
lows for MFNs, but changes how they affect labor relations, will address much
of the underlying problem. It will also fit current labor law more comfortably
which includes MFNs among mandatory subjects of bargaining.20 8
For an individual employer who leaves an association and seeks to ne-
gotiate directly with its employees' union, the employer's first trouble will be a
threatened strike. If the employer's employees strike to assert economic pres-
sure, the employer may hire replacement workers, including permanent re-
placements if it chooses, although the striking employees have the right to re-
call.209 In striking, the union can picket and seek to assert pressure against re-
placement workers going to work and against workers in other trades visiting
the place of work. This can be a formidable tactic if the employees in other
trades refuse to cross the picket line. In the construction industry, for example,
when the employer is one of many subcontractors on a job, and the many other
trades on the job honor the picket, the general contractor may demand that such
a struck employer sign a contract with the union or be thrown off the project.
207 See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
20 Dolly Madison Indus., Inc., 182 N.L.R.B. 1037, 1038 (1970) (holding that an employer has
a right to insist on an MFN in bargaining).
209 See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 346 (1938) (first ruling that employ-
ers have a right to permanently replace striking workers, but that those same workers remain
employees of the employer).
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The union must refrain from picketing a "reserve gate" so as to not assert sec-
ondary pressure, but the pressure on the general can still be substantial.21 o
The union would think twice about picketing, however, if a picket
would be considered an unfair labor practice. Making a picket an unfair labor
practice may seem a strong tactic in this situation. However, without limiting
the ability of the union to picket, an employer in such a situation is only left
with the option of waiting out the strike and picket, and hoping to stay in busi-
ness in the meantime. This is an employer who has left the association because
it cannot afford to pay association wages, i.e. an employer with economic prob-
lems greater than those of association members. The strike and picket will only
worsen these problems. If it agrees to the association's wage package in the
face of such a strike and picket, it will then avert the strike, but now will have to
operate with the wage rates that prompted it to leave in the first place. There-
fore, a change in the law that would give such an employer greater bargaining
power would be to make picketing of the employer an unfair labor practice
when the employer will not agree to an association's wage package where the
association has an MFN clause in its contract. This will give the union conse-
quences for agreeing to an MFN.
Note that this would not preclude a strike of such an employer, but only
picketing. This way the employees of an employer can assert their own eco-
nomic pressure on their employer, but they and their union cannot picket to
pressure replacement workers or other trades from doing business with the em-
ployer. A picket brings the union's resources into play, subsidized from dues
paid by employees of association members. The union can send otherwise un-
employed members and union business agents to the picket line, paid to picket
out of the union's coffers.2 1 1 This, in effect, is the cartel acting to suppress
competition. A ban on such picketing ameliorates this activity.
An objection to this proposal is that employers will frivolously assert
that they cannot afford association wages. After all, most employers are more
concerned about what their competitors pay, not the absolute wages paid.212 In
this sense leaving an association is not escaping a cartel but cheating on one.
Employers will have an incentive, goes the objection, to cry poverty and then be
shielded from picketing, even as they pay non-union wages and benefits to re-
placement workers. However, labor law is already very familiar with an em-
ployer's assertions that it cannot afford wages, and such an assertion, and a de-
rivative impasse assertion, is already an unfair labor practice. If an employer
who has left an association claims it cannot afford to pay the association wage
210 Stephen Evans & Roy Lewis, Union Organization, Collective Bargaining & the Law: An
Anglo-American Comparison of the Construction Industry, 10 COMP. LAB. L.J. 473, 483 (1989)
("Peaceful strikes and picketing directed at the strikers' own primary employer are protected by
section 7 of the Act. If the employees of secondary firms honour the primary strike or picket,
thereby disrupting the business of those firms, the action remains lawful.").
211 See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
212 See Lande & Zerbe, supra note 18, at 207 n.54.
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package the union can file an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB and if
the NLRB finds the employer's claim was not made in good faith it can issue a
complaint and order the employer to bargain. It is already well-established that
if an employer cries poverty in bargaining it can be ordered to produce financial
records to document why it cannot agree to the union's demanded wages.213
Under the scenario advocated here, all of that can still occur except that the un-
ion could not also picket the employer if the employer's claim is made in good
faith. It may be how this would occur in practice is that an employer would
implement its final offer and the union would file an unfair labor practice
charge. If the NLRB then finds no unfair labor practice the union could not
begin a picket. If the union did anyway, the picket itself would be an unfair
labor practice and the employer could seek damages from the union.2 14
C. Adjustment to Withdrawal Liability Assessments
Another remedy that would give individual employers a greater chance
to leave an association and bargain with a union is to allow them to continue
participating in a multiemployer defined benefit plan even after the union and
the employer fail to agree on a new contract and go their separate ways. This
would allow the employer to avoid withdrawal liability. If an individual em-
ployer cannot agree to a contract because of the union's MFN clause with the
association or because of some other intractable reason related to the associa-
tion, the employer will permanently cease to have a duty to contribute to the
defined benefit pension plan and will likely incur withdrawal liability.2 15 This
can amount to hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars.216 The amount de-
pends on the actuarial soundness of the plan, through a complicated formula
considering the unfunded liabilities of the plan, and not on any malfeasance
committed by the employer.217
213 Winter, supra note 39, at 56; NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956); Int'l Chem.
Workers Union Council v. NLRB, 467 F.3d 742, 750 (9th Cir. 2006) ("An asserted inability to
pay, whether made in writing or orally, is the cornerstone of an alleged Truitt violation.").
214 The statutory hook by which the Board could enforce the rule herein proposed against pick-
eting an individual employer in the context of a multiemployer CBA with an MFN would perhaps
most naturally be section 8(b)(3), union refusal to bargain. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (2006). This
certainly would be beyond the Board's current 8(b)(3) jurisprudence, but as a prophylactic rule to
encourage a union to bargain (albeit through indirect means) it fits with the text of 8(b)(3) which
makes it an unfair labor practice "to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer, provided it is
the representative of his employees subject to the provisions of section 159(a)." Id.
215 See 29 U.S.C. § 1383(a) (2006) (defining a "complete withdrawal" as "(1) permanently
ceas[ing] to have an obligation to contribute under the plan, or (2) permanently ceas[ing] all cov-
ered operations under the plan"). The "obligation" would, of course, cease once a CBA no longer
requires an employer to contribute, even though it still engages in covered operations.
216 See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
217 See 29 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (detailing calculations required to determine withdrawal liability).
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The statutorily-required permanent cessation to contribute, however,
would not occur if the employer were allowed to continue to participate in the
defined benefit plan even though it had no contract with the union. Then an
employer could seek to bargain individually with the union, the union would
rebuff its offer due to its MFN clause with the association, then implement its
final offer but include in that offer to continue contributing to the defined bene-
fit plan. The plan would then have to take those contributions even though the
employer would have no union contract, and no likelihood of one. Such an op-
tion would require amendments to ERISA.m It would not give an individual
employer the chance to obtain pension benefits for its employees at a lower rate
of contributions, as the employer would have to abide by the contribution rate
the plan's trustees set. What the employer would gain is that its wage rates, or
the rate it pays other benefits, could be lower than the associations'. It would
also, of course, allow the individual employer to escape the potentially onerous
withdrawal liability award, and keep its employees in their pension plan and
continue building credits toward their retirement.
With these changes made to the law-a ban on picketing of withdrawn
employers and an option out of withdrawal liability-how would the union's
and association's behavior change? If the union and the association made no
changes to their contract, and continued using a strong MFN clause, the union
would be less able to keep individual employers from continuing operations
after bargaining to impasse. Also, if the cartel maintains a defined benefit plan
the employer would be able to avoid withdrawal liability and be more likely to
leave the association, and thus undercut association wages (but not pension con-
tribution levels).219 If the union and association continued to make no changes,
more and more employers would be able to leave the association, and therefore
the union as well, weakening the market power of the association members as a
percentage of the product and labor markets. The union would be concerned
about this trend both because of the lower wages and benefits that many union
members would be earning, because those members would likely leave the un-
ion altogether leading to lower dues income, and because of the competition that
its other members' employers-association employers-would then face.
The union would be confronted with a dilemma. Either it continues to
allow an MFN clause in its contract with the association and continues to lose
employers and members, or it refuses to agree to an MFN clause, trade off
something in return (perhaps lower wages or benefits, perhaps another issue),
218 The definition of "complete withdrawal" under 29 U.S.C. § 1383(a) would need an excep-
tion for employers who do not have an "obligation to contribute" but are allowed to contribute
because of a multiemployer CBA with an MFN that prevents meaningful bargaining between the
contributing employer and the union.
219 In fact, the change in withdrawal liability rules might help the soundness of multiemployer
defined benefit plans because the plan would have less employers it would have to go after to
collect upon withdrawal liability, and thus less of a chance that such a collection would not result
in a full recovery.
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and then bargain directly with individual non-association employers where the
two parties can actually compromise on material terms. Given the hemorrhag-
ing that the union may experience if it keeps an MFN clause, it is very possible
that the union would bargain away the MFN clause and then have a chance to
realistically bargain with the independent employers.
An objection that may be raised here is that this would lead to lower
wages and benefits. That is likely, but in itself is not a valid objection. The
union will still have the power to organize employers and gain monopoly con-
trol over labor relations. It also will have all of the other rights it currently en-
joys in the labor laws. This would even include picketing of an individual em-
ployer who refused to sign a contract if the union does not have an MFN clause
in its association contract. It would not be as easy for the union to bargain equal
wages across a locality's industry, as is often the case today, 220 but it is ques-
tionable whether this is a worthy normative goal in the first place. If an em-
ployer's business model or market niche does not allow it to earn as much as its
competitors, why should the union nevertheless insist that the employer pay the
same wage as the competitors? Indeed, a normatively more justifiable goal
would be for each employer to pay the same percentage of its profits, or manag-
ers' salaries, or otherwise, to its bargaining unit employees. Then employers are
not proportionally burdened more than their competitors, at least to the same
degree, just because they do not make as much money. This metric has other
problems, such a inhibiting the employer's incentive to make higher profits, but
is normatively not inferior to the goal of equal wages across an industry.
Another objection to the rule proposed here is that it would be harder
for a union to bargain simply because there would be more contracts and there-
fore more hours of bargaining. This would depend on the circumstances, but,
on the contrary, the drudgery of having to bargain will be felt more by the em-
ployers than the union.221 All but the smallest unions retain business agents,
paid by members' dues, whose job is to bargain contracts, police contracts, and
attend to members' needs.222 For employers, on the other hand, unless they are
very large, they likely will have one or maybe a handful of people who spend all
of their time on human resources matters and have the time to meet with union
representatives and bargain. Indeed, to the extent that associations will retain
power it will be due to the gain that employers receive from banding together
for the convenience of having someone else, e.g. association representatives, do
their bargaining. This is closer to the original reason employers formed associa-
220 See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text (discussing taking wages out of competition
as a major union objective).
221 This is contrary to the conventional wisdom outlined above. See supra note 40 and accom-
panying text.
222 Roger C. Hartley, The Framework of Democracy in Union Government, 32 CATH. U. L.
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tions-to counteract union power-than the modem trend of forming union-
employer cartels.22 3
VI. CONCLUSION
The reader may at this point object to the narrow relief afforded in this
Article and ask "why not just ban multiemployer bargaining?" There are two
reactions to this. First, it is unclear how much multiemployer bargaining itself
helps or hurts individual employers. Perhaps if the institution did not exist at all
there would be endless whipsaw strikes. These would still be permissible under
the above-proposed changes to the labor laws, as long as an MFN is not in-
volved. Employers not brave enough to weather a strike on their own would
still want the shelter of their fellow employers.
Second, there is little empirical work available on multiemployer bar-
gaining, and both unions and employers just do not know what would happen if
the method were taken away. This is especially true given that, to paraphrase
from another context, multiemployer bargaining has "always been with us."
Unforeseen perverse incentives could arise with a simple shut-down of the abili-
ty of employers to band together to deal with their employees' bargaining repre-
sentative. What we do know is that multiemployer bargaining is one of the
closest things in labor law to a "state of nature" phenomenon. It has perhaps
existed as long as unions have organized themselves. Banning the practice en-
tirely would merely push the discussions that employers have among themselves
when faced with a united union into the shadows. A better policy is to keep
multiemployer bargaining in the open, protected from the antitrust laws, but also
regulated through limiting the ability of the cartel it creates to keep employers in
its clutches.
223 See supra notes 5-10 and accompanying text (discussing the history of employer associa-
tions before passage of the modem labor laws).
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